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This paper argues that the Supreme Court made a serious mistake last term, 
when, in a case of interstate government tort, it tore up useful options that should 
be available to each state for the rare cases in which they would be of service. In 
seeking to insulate a state from liability when its employee intrudes on a sister 
state’s territory and causes injury there, the Court stripped every state of power, in 
cases of interstate government tort, to try injuries occurring on its own territory to 
its own residents—an unprecedented disregard of a state’s acknowledged 
traditional interests. Indeed, the Court went beyond interstate government tort and 
seemed to say that the Constitution prohibits litigation against a state in all cases, 
whether to enforce state or federal law, whether in state or federal courts. It is 
argued that the Court’s originalist and structural arguments cannot withstand 
scrutiny. Moreover, the Court’s position, if firmly established, would balk the 
actual interests even of a state as defendant. The states typically do see a need to 
meet their tort responsibilities. Real damage has been done, but it is argued that 
conservative and liberal views on judicial review of government action in time 
may well converge to put an end to judicial abnegation of the duty to place 
government at all levels under the rule of law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s overrule of Nevada v. Hall1 this past Term 
was widely perceived to be a threat to Roe v. Wade.2 Reporters of le-
1. 440 U.S. 40 (1979) (Stevens, J.) (holding that there is no principle of sovereign 
immunity that would prevent California from taking jurisdiction over Nevada, where negli-
gent driving by a University of Nevada driver caused a collision in California resulting in se-
vere personal injuries to a California family). For interesting perspectives on Nevada v. Hall,
see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The International Origins of American Federalism,
120 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (2020); Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 1077 (2018); and James E. Pfander & Jessica Dwinell, A Declaratory Theory of State Ac-
countability, 102 VA. L. REV. 153 (2016).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have a constitutional right to abortion in 
the first trimester of pregnancy; in the second trimester, that the state can render nugatory 
the right to abortion by purporting to regulate for the safety of the mother; and in the third 
trimester, that the interest of the fetus is paramount and that the state can prohibit abortion 
outright).
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gal news could find little else to say3 about Nevada v. Hall or its 
overruling case, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.4 But neither case had 
anything to do with Roe v. Wade. The apparent threat to Roe lay in 
the fact that lawyers arguing in support of Nevada v. Hall relied al-
most exclusively on stare decisis.5 The thinking was that if a prece-
dent of forty years’ vintage could be tossed aside, Roe must be in 
danger. As far as the press could see, Nevada v. Hall itself was of no 
interest.
After all, Nevada v. Hall was a very ordinary case involving a two-
car collision.6 Its apparently surprising holding,7 that a state could 
3. See, e.g., Editorial, Liberals Who Cry Roe, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/liberals-who-cry-roe-11557876134 [https://perma.cc/FRU6-
YMSL]; Leah Litman, Opinion, Supreme Court Liberals Raise Alarm Bells About Roe v. Wade:
Conservatives May be Laying the Foundation for the Reversal of the Landmark Abortion Decision, N.Y.
TIMES (May 13, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/opinion/roe-supreme-
court.html https://perma.cc/HGK9-GAU3]; see also Thomas J. Molony, Taking Another Look 
at the Call on the Field: Roe, Chief Justice Roberts, and Stare Decisis, 4 HARV. J.L. & SOC. POL. 733 
(2020) (taking the same tack).
4. 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) (reversing Nevada v. Hall in view of the paucity of cases 
relying on it and holding that the Constitution does not “permit” disregard of a state’s sov-
ereign immunity). One month after this decision was handed down, the Federal Circuit de-
parted from it, declining to extend state sovereign immunity to administrative patent pro-
ceedings. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
The Federal Circuit relied on a theory of “constructive” waiver that occurs when the state 
seeks the benefit of the patent system by applying for a patent, a theory once suggested to 
me by my former colleague, Mitch Berman, who later concluded dispiritedly that the idea 
could not get off the ground. I agreed, recalling that the doctrine of “constructive waiver,”
see Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), had been disapproved in Atascadero State 
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). See Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & 
Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How To “Fix”
Florida Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037 (2001). The Constitution’s explicit 
grant to Congress of power over intellectual property, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing that, 
in order to encourage science and the useful arts, Congress may grant patents and copy-
rights for limited times), arguably should have saved patent and copyright cases from the 
indefensible rule of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), improvidently stripping 
Congress of Article I power to overcome the Eleventh Amendment. But the Federal Circuit’s
exercise in legal realism, although distinguishing administrative from judicial proceedings 
and stressing the explicitness of the grant of power over patents, could not overcome Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999),
which held the state immune notwithstanding the specificity of the patent and copyright 
power in Article I, Section 8. The Supreme Court has since carved out a needed exception 
to Seminole Tribe for cases in bankruptcy. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 
(2006). But the Katz exception is limited to bankruptcy. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 
1002 (2020). There will be no further exceptions.
5. Dean Chemerinsky’s fine brief for Hyatt stressed that there was no reason to over-
rule Nevada v. Hall, Brief for Respondent at 31–32, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 
1485 (2019) (No. 114-1175), 2015 WL 6467826, as did his oral argument, Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 38, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299), 2019 
WL 144815. For a similar concern for stare decisis, see also Stephen Vladeck’s fine Brief of 
Professors of Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Franchise 
Tax Board v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No. 114-1175), 2018 WL 6168772. (I was a signa-
tory). I note that neither the Chemerinsky brief nor the Vladeck brief argued for Nevada v. 
Hall on its merits.
6. For the facts of Nevada v. Hall, see supra note 1; and infra notes 37–38.
7. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 446–47 (1979).
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haul another state into its courts, also turned out to be of slight 
importance, if the frequency of resort to it is any measure. In the 
forty years since Nevada v. Hall was decided, only fourteen cases re-
lying on it could be unearthed, with all the diligence of counsel 
and amici.8
Shortly before his death,9 Justice Stevens, author of Nevada v. 
Hall, was interviewed about the death of that case. Stevens pointed 
out that the very sparseness of cases that allowed the Franchise
Court to find insufficient reason to preserve Nevada v. Hall could 
as easily have prompted the Court to find insufficient reason to 
overrule it.10 Even Justice Stevens had little of substance to say 
about the case. But in my opinion Nevada v. Hall deserved to be 
argued on its merits.
The occasion for reconsideration of a forty-year-old case was the 
long litigation in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt,11 which came to a 
head in 2019, its third iteration before the Supreme Court.12 Like 
Nevada v. Hall, Franchise Tax Board was a case against state officials. 
But Franchise Tax Board, unlike Nevada v. Hall, was not about some 
ordinary road accident in another state. Nevada v. Hall involved the 
negligence or recklessness of a driver who happened to be a state 
worker driving a state university car into another state, on state 
business.13 Instead, the tort in Franchise Tax Board was deliberate. Of-
ficials of one state were found by a jury to have behaved in another 
state with intentional and damaging abusiveness.14 The only thing 
our two cases had in common was that in each of them a state was 
held to be within the jurisdiction of another state.
The question whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall had been 
raised twice previously in the Franchise Tax Board litigation. In 2003, 
in what I will call Franchise I, the Court, by Justice O’Connor, unan-
8. The paucity of cases was noted during oral argument by both Justice Alito and Jus-
tice Kavanaugh. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 
1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299), 2019 WL 144815 (Alito, J.) (“Is there any reliance here?”); id. at 
54 (Kavanaugh, J.) (“[T]here’s no real reliance interest at stake.”). The paucity of cases is 
probably best explained by the fact that they typically arise between neighboring states en-
gaged in substantial interstate activity, rather than between any two of fifty states.
9. Justice Stevens passed away on July 16, 2019.
10. Justice Stevens remarked that “overruling Nevada against Hall—it makes absolutely 
no sense . . . . Because states have been sued in the courts of other states so rarely, that you 
might just as well have a rule you can follow rather than change it 40 years later for a differ-
ent rule that clearly is not any better than the other one.” Ask the Author: Interview with Justice 
John Paul Stevens, SCOTUSBLOG (June 12, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06
/ask-the-author-interview-with-justice-john-paul-stevens [https://perma.cc/58XS-CUHU].
11. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt (Franchise III), 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (Thomas, J.).
12. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt (Franchise I), 538 U.S. 488 (2003) (O’Connor, J.); Fran-
chise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt (Franchise II), 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (Breyer, J.).
13. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 446–47.
14. See Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1491 (Thomas, J.) (discussing the jury award).
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imously sustained Nevada v. Hall.15 Then, in a 2016 iteration of the 
case, Franchise II, the Court granted certiorari, among other issues to 
reconsider Nevada v. Hall.16 But then the unexpected death of Jus-
tice Scalia left a sudden vacancy on the Court, and President 
Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland to succeed Scalia was 
buried by the determined inaction of the Senate.17 So it fell to an 
eight-Justice Court in Franchise II to decide whether to overrule Ne-
vada v. Hall. The Court split 4:4 on that issue,18 with the result that 
Nevada v. Hall was let stand—for the time being.
At last, in 2019, in Franchise III, the question whether to overrule 
Nevada v. Hall was cleanly presented,19 and a nine-Justice Court 
stood ready to decide it.20 Nevada v. Hall was overruled. When liti-
gation under Nevada v. Hall was disapproved, obviously litigation 
under Franchise III was cashiered as well, since both were state as-
sertions of jurisdiction over another state.
It is a chief argument of this paper that the loss of access to civil 
courts at the place of injury and plaintiff’s home in these cases is 
seriously to be regretted. One might suppose that this loss of access 
to adjudication at the place of injury and the plaintiff’s home 
might not matter much, as long as the defendant state can be sued 
in its own courts. But in Franchise III, the Supreme Court was ap-
parently of the view that a defendant state may not be sued at 
home, either. According to Justice Thomas, writing for the narrow 
conservative majority in Franchise III, a state can never be sued, at 
home or away, without its consent. There is blanket immunity.
This immunity is a matter of federal, not state law. The federali-
zation of the defense of state immunity began in 1795 with the 
15. Franchise I, 538 U.S. at 496.
16. 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (granting certiorari in Franchise III).
17. Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016. President Obama nominated Merrick 
Garland to replace him on March 16, 2016. See U.S. Senators on the Nomination of 
Merrick Garland, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/U.S._Senators_on_thenomination_
of_Merrick_Garland [https://perma.cc/DXU3-93B5].
18. Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1280 (Breyer, J.). There was a dissent by Chief Justice Rob-
erts, joined by Justice Thomas. 136 S. Ct. at 1283. There was also a silent concurrence by 
Justice Alito. Id. On the uses of silent concurrences, see Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Concurrenc-
es, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 351 (2016).
19. The question of whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall in this iteration of the Franchise 
Tax Board litigation was the only question presented. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1490 (stating 
that certiorari was granted to decide this sole question). In contrast, in Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 
1277, the 2016 case, a main question, bizarrely, was whether, under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, the Nevada court had to apply Nevada’s own immunity law to a sister state within its 
jurisdiction. Id. at 1281–83. Of course, the obligations of a court under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause are to another state, not the forum state. Moreover, as the position has devel-
oped, the obligation is to the other state’s judgments, not its laws. See infra notes 67, 76, 89–92
and accompanying text.
20. Justice Brett Kavanaugh was sworn in on October 8, 2018. The case was argued Jan-
uary 9, 2019.
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Eleventh Amendment,21 prohibiting federal diversity jurisdiction 
over a state in a state-law case. The Supreme Court has been ex-
panding the scope of federalized state immunity ever since. By the 
end of the twentieth century, this untethered process had culmi-
nated in Alden v. Maine,22 insulating state defendants from suits to 
enforce federal law in the state’s own courts.
The trouble with Franchise III is that it extends the shield of fed-
eral immunity to state courts in state-law cases. It did so notwith-
standing the Tenth Amendment, which would seem to reserve 
such matters to the states.23 Justice Thomas achieved this by 
grounding federalized immunity on the vague premise that “the 
Constitution” does not “permit” suits against an unconsenting 
state.24 Justice Thomas located federalized state sovereign immuni-
ty in the structure and history of the Constitution. This holding, on 
these arguments, necessarily implies blanket federalized state im-
munity in all cases, state or federal, whether tried in federal courts, 
the courts of a sister state, or in the state’s own courts.
To justify this radical position, Justice Thomas offered familiar 
originalist, but, in my view, ahistorical25 claims for state immunity. 
He relied in part upon statements made during the Founding pe-
riod which might be thought to imply constitutional recognition of 
state sovereignty. (One is reminded of a famous comment by 
Holmes: “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law 
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”26) But to the 
extent that any of Thomas’s historical arguments had some objec-
tive correlative in the eighteenth century, they tended to support 
the states’ own view of sovereign immunity—that the defense, 
21. The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits federal diversi-
ty suits in state-law cases against a state, was extended to federal-question cases in federal 
courts in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment, read literally, 
furnishes only a rule of construction for the several diversity jurisdictions to which the fed-
eral judicial power extends under Article III of the Constitution. In the Amendment’s over-
ride of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), a diversity action against a state on an 
ordinary contract, the Eleventh Amendment obviously is intended to shield states from suit 
in federal court only in state-law cases typical of the diversity jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts.
22. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding the states to be shielded with federalized sovereign 
immunity in their own courts in suits to enforce an act of Congress).
23. This was one of Dean Chemerinsky’s points in oral argument. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 28, 31, Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299), 2019 WL 144815.
24. See Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1490 (“This case . . . requires us to decide whether the 
Constitution permits a State to be sued by a private party without its consent in the courts of a 
different State.”) (emphasis added). On this formulation of the issue, see infra notes 108, 
124 and accompanying text.
25. For the actual history, see infra Sections III.B–C.
26. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). Iron-
ically, Justice Thomas, the author of Franchise III, has quoted this himself. See Dietz v. Bould-
in, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1897 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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where it existed among the states in early days, was a creature of a 
state’s own common law. Justice Thomas had to acknowledge this 
fact.27 There was no early precedent for federalized state sovereign 
immunity.
But there is a later history of federal-law immunity for the states. 
The Eleventh Amendment of 1795 is a rule of construction for the 
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, immunizing a state from 
commercial liability to a nonresident in state-law cases.28 In 1890, in 
Hans v. Louisiana,29 the Supreme Court, in an apparent attempt to 
avoid declaring the Amendment anomalous and obsolete (anoma-
lous because prohibiting suits against a state by nonresidents but 
not by residents), extended Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts to their federal-question 
jurisdiction. This relieved states of the duty—at least in federal 
courts—of complying with acts of Congress or the Constitution. It 
also created a further anomaly—federal immunity would be opera-
tive in one set of courts only. As if unwilling to acknowledge error, 
or perhaps in nostalgia for an antebellum view of states’ rights, or 
perhaps in the spirit of reconciliation between North and South, 
the Supreme Court thereafter doubled down on the Eleventh 
Amendment and has been piling up a superstructure of further ex-
tensions of it ever since. In a late case the Court went so far as to 
extend federalized immunity in federal-law cases to actions against 
a state in state courts.30 But even so, it was not foreseen that the 
Court would go so far as to discover a federal sovereign immunity 
for the states from state-law actions in state courts.
Justice Breyer, dissenting in Franchise III, responded to Justice 
Thomas’s historical arguments with his own set of originalist ideas. 
He attempted to find respondent Hyatt’s stare decisis argument 
convincing, but it was scarcely more so than Thomas’s historicist 
argument, given the apparent lack of large-scale reliance on Neva-
27. See 139 S. Ct. at 1494 (Thomas, J.) (“In short, at the time of the founding, it was well 
settled that States were immune under both the common law and the law of nations.”). This 
would be more or less true, perhaps, if Justice Thomas had limited the conclusion to the 
period preceding the Founding and made clear that he was talking about state common law 
and general international law. See William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional 
Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017) (arguing that state sovereign immunity originally was a matter 
of state common law and had nothing to do with the Constitution).
28. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
state.”).
29. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
30. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). For early extensions of federalized state im-
munity under the Eleventh Amendment, see, for example, LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL 
COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 779–846 
(1994).
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da v. Hall. Justice Breyer did not consider the usefulness of Nevada 
v. Hall, save for a bare remark about interests on “both sides.”31
I have said that Nevada v. Hall should have been argued and 
considered on its merits. Its actual empowerment of the states in 
their shared interests should have commended Nevada v. Hall to 
the states, as well as to the Supreme Court, as a positive good.32
These shared interests, widely understood, are the states’ govern-
mental interests in providing their residents with access to their 
own courts, in compensating their residents for injuries caused by 
the unlawful conduct of another, and in deterring any such con-
duct on their territory in the future. These are fundamental tort 
policies in every state.
The states might have paused, in their rush to sign briefs de-
manding overrule of Nevada v. Hall, to consider the further inter-
est they share, not only with each other but with the nation—an in-
terest in “domestic tranquility”33—in interstate peace. Under the 
new blanket federal immunity in cases of interstate government 
tort, there can be little interstate peace because courts will have 
lost their power, through civil suits brought by their own residents, 
to provide a judicial check on another government’s misconduct 
on their own territory. How can our federalism help but be dimin-
ished under such license?
If we disregard as dictum the Court’s apparent extension of fed-
eralized immunity to the tortfeasor state in its own courts, and limit 
Franchise III to its facts, it raises the narrower question whether the 
Court should have denied to private persons access to their own 
state’s courts just because the defendant is a state actor. It is not 
customary in our jurisprudence to deny injured residents access to
their own state’s courts for suit against nonresident tortfeasors over 
whom jurisdiction can be obtained. The typical state long-arm stat-
ute is all that is needed. We pay taxes for our state courts, and, un-
til Franchise III, it was generally assumed that a state citizen’s choice 
to sue at home, if jurisdiction over the defendant can be obtained, 
would be respected as a matter of course.
31. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1504 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (remarking that 
“sovereignty interests here lie on both sides of the constitutional equation”).
32. For commentary urging overrule of Nevada v. Hall, see, for example, Timothy Dill, 
A Test of Sovereignty: Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Gilbert P. Hyatt, 14 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 129 (2019); and Ann Woolhandler, Interstate Sover-
eign Immunity, 2006 S. CT. REV. 249, 254–59 (2006).
33. The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States sets out the purposes of the 
Constitution: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do or-
dain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”
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Yet forty-five states were signatory to amicus briefs urging over-
rule of Nevada v. Hall.34 These were heavy guns indeed, and we lost 
Nevada v. Hall. One wonders to what calculation of advantage we 
can ascribe the zeal of so many states in rushing to sign briefs urg-
ing the Supreme Court to strip their own courts of the option to 
govern events within their own borders under their own law.
Nothing in Nevada v. Hall or Franchise I impaired the sovereignty 
of each state in its own courts or a state’s power to adjudicate inju-
ries to its own residents on its own territory.35 But overruling those 
cases did.36
I. OUR TWO CASES
A. Nevada v. Hall
The Nevada v. Hall story began back in 1968. A University of Ne-
vada employee drove into California in a university car on universi-
ty business and there collided with another car, causing serious 
personal injuries to the California occupants of the other car.37
The Nevada driver was killed.38
The injured Californians filed suit at home in California. The 
Nevada driver’s estate, if any, could offer little in the way of mean-
ingful compensation. But the University of Nevada is an arm of the 
state of Nevada, and jurisdiction over the state was asserted when it 
was asserted over the university. The state, filing a special appear-
ance, moved for dismissal on the point of jurisdiction, arguing that 
a state cannot take jurisdiction over a sister state. As to such at-
tempted jurisdiction, Nevada argued, all states are immune. The 
lower California court, agreeing, dismissed.39 But eventually the 
34. See Brief of Indiana and 44 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (No. 17-1299), 2018 WL 1850970; Brief of the Council of State 
Governments, National Ass’n of Counties, National League of Cities, United States Confer-
ence of Mayors, City/County Management Ass’n & International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (No. 14-1175), 2015 WL 
5316999.
35. Justice Breyer made this point in his dissent in Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1504, as did 
Justice Sotomayor in oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Franchise III, 139 S. 
Ct. 1485 (No. 17-1299), 2019 WL 144815.
36. Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (Stevens, J.) (stating that, if the states are 
forced to accord each other immunity that would be a greater offense to state sovereignty 
than prohibiting them from doing so).
37. See id. at 413 n.4 (“The evidence indicated that respondent John Hall, a minor at 
the time of the accident, sustained severe head injuries resulting in permanent brain dam-
age which left him severely retarded and unable to care for himself, and that respondent 
Patricia Hall, his mother, suffered severe physical and emotional injuries.”).
38. Id.
39. Hall v. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d 1363 (Cal. 1972) (en banc).
10 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:1
California Supreme Court reversed, sustaining California’s jurisdic-
tion over Nevada.40 The United States Supreme Court denied certio-
rari.41
Back in the California trial court, the jury awarded the plaintiffs 
damages of $1,125,000.42 In 1979, the Supreme Court, in an opin-
ion by Justice Stevens, affirmed.43 Justice Stevens found nothing in 
the Eleventh Amendment or its background postulates44 that would 
immunize a state in a sister state’s courts. He pointed to Califor-
nia’s governmental interests as the place of wrongful conduct and 
injury—interests in deterring unsafety on California’s roads and in 
compensating Californians injured by such unsafety.45
There was a dissent by Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist.46 There was also a dissent by Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger.47 To a millennial eye, 
both dissents seem weak. Justice Blackmun trod the ground in a 
tentative way, and Justice Rehnquist, in a rambling opinion, 
rounded up the usual references.
To my mind, Nevada v. Hall solved a real problem: the existence 
of a remedial gap. Until Nevada v. Hall, there seems to have been 
no thought given to the propriety of trial of one state in the courts 
of another, perhaps because state officials have little business out 
of state, as evidenced by the above-noted paucity of cases that 
emerged in the wake of Nevada v. Hall.48 And since the state of Ne-
vada waives immunity, there would have been jurisdiction over the 
defendant state, Nevada, in any event in its own courts. That is why, 
in Nevada v. Hall, Nevada did not plead sovereign immunity.49 Ne-
vada’s own sovereign immunity statute need not matter to a court 
in another state. But the fact is that Nevada had waived its immuni-
ty—although Nevada capped its waiver at the then-meager figure 
of $25,000.50 California was free to ignore Nevada’s $25,000 cap. 
Every state is always free to apply its own law to the question of the 
40. Id.
41. Hall v. Univ. of Nev., 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
42. All online calculators consulted conclude that the amount of the 1972 jury award 
would be about $5,550,000 in 2019 dollars.
43. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 427 (affirming the California judgment below).
44. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.) 
(referring to “postulates which limit and control” and holding a state immune from suit in 
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, although in terms such suit is available un-
der Article III, if the action is brought by a foreign state).
45. 440 U.S. at 424.
46. Id. at 427. Rehnquist did not become Chief Justice until 1985.
47. Id. at 432.
48. On the paucity of cases, see supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text.
49. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (2019).
50. Id.
FALL 2020] Sovereign Immunity and Interstate Government Tort 11
immunity vel non of another state.51 The Nevada “cap” could not tie 
California’s hands to defeat California’s own compensatory and 
deterrent interests. California, as the place of wrongful conduct, 
the place of injury, and the residence of the plaintiff, had every in-
terest in taking jurisdiction. And it was entitled to deploy its own 
tort law on the merits—as Justice Stevens pointed out.52 California 
law, like the law of every state in the Union, provides compensation 
and deterrence for a tort on the state’s own roads injuring the 
state’s own residents.
Interestingly, in the later case of Alden v. Maine,53 in extending 
federal sovereign immunity to a state in an action under federal 
law in the state’s own courts, the Supreme Court had not overruled 
Nevada v. Hall, but had distinguished it.54 Although the Alden Court, 
by Justice Kennedy, ruled that a state cannot be sued in its own 
courts without its consent, even to enforce an act of Congress, a
state could nevertheless be sued in a sister state.55 Justice Kennedy saw 
that the sister state would have policies and interests of its own to 
vindicate.
Franchise III overrules Alden on that point.
B. Franchise Tax Board
Now let us turn to the interesting litigation in Franchise Tax 
Board v. Hyatt. This case, which wound up in the Supreme Court 
three times, was there first in 2003 (Franchise I).56 In this case, it was 
a Nevada court that took jurisdiction over California. The tables were 
turned.
Gilbert P. Hyatt (no connection with the hotels) is a man of con-
siderable wealth, the inventor of a useful computer chip. It seems 
clear that Mr. Hyatt moved to Nevada to avoid California’s high 
taxes. According to California’s taxing authority, the Franchise Tax 
51. For the general rule denying power to a defendant sovereign to immunize itself in 
the courts of another sovereign, see infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.1.
52. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 426–27 (discussing California’s compensatory and regu-
latory interests).
53. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
54. Id. at 738–39 (distinguishing and saving Nevada v. Hall).
55. Id.
56. Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003) (O’Connor, J. for a unanimous court) (hold-
ing, under Nevada v. Hall, that Nevada could take jurisdiction over California); id. at 496–97 
(declining to distinguish between governmental functions and non-governmental func-
tions). Salient distinctions, not acknowledged and thus not addressed by Justice O’Connor, 
would seem to be, first, the distinction between unintentional and intentional torts; second, 
the distinction between ordinary workers and officials; third, the distinction between breach 
of a duty pleadable as an ordinary tort and breach of a constitutional duty; and fourth, the 
distinction between personal misconduct and state action.
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Board, Mr. Hyatt left California allegedly owing that sunny state 
some $13 million.57 Hyatt denied this, insisting that he was fully 
paid up when he left California. It all depended on the date of Hy-
att’s move to Nevada. But this Nevada case was not about any of 
that.
Now living in Nevada, Hyatt was fighting back with a grievance 
of his own. While continuing his battle with California’s tax collec-
tors in California, he filed suit against California’s Franchise Tax 
Board in Nevada, complaining of abuses in Nevada by California’s
auditors.
Could Hyatt have sued in California? This question was posed by 
Justice Sotomayor during oral argument.58 With her customary in-
sight, she pointed out that the availability of a remedy at home im-
plied that the sovereign immunity issue lacked substance. But for 
those who might read her question as a suggestion that Hyatt ought
to have sued at home, it will be helpful to point out that Hyatt’s
Nevada suit was not about taxes in California—the subject of his 
ongoing struggle back in California—but about a tort in Nevada.59
Were Hyatt’s claims frivolous? He alleged that the California tax 
auditors came after him extraterritorially in Nevada and engaged 
there in a course of harassment and abusive misconduct, inten-
tionally inflicting emotional distress upon him. The Nevada jury 
found most of this to be true.60
It was the audit from hell. The California auditors peered 
through his windows. They read his mail. They rummaged through 
his garbage. They lied to him about the confidentiality of some of 
his information and then released that confidential information to 
the very persons with whom he did not want to share it. They de-
layed resolution of his protests. They intruded into his place of 
work, rummaging through his files. They bustled noisily into his 
synagogue. They made disparaging remarks about his religion. 
Perhaps the unkindest cut was their seeking out and questioning 
Hyatt’s estranged relatives. Witnesses testified that Hyatt’s emo-
tional distress was patent, that he was drinking heavily, and that he 
suffered severe migraine headaches and abdominal pains. In sum, 
57. Hyatt eventually wound up substantially victorious in his California tax dispute, 
agreeing to pay $2 million to California. See Zach Weissmueller, California Tried To Seize Mil-
lions of This Inventor’s Fortune. He Fought Back. And Won., REASON (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://reason.com/archives/2017/10/23/gilbert-hyatts-25-year-battle-against-ca/print 
[https://perma.cc/9STM-5MJ8].
58. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488 (No. 02-42), 2003 WL 
439743.
59. On the congeries of immunities arguably involved in the case, see infra text accom-
panying notes 62–65.
60. 335 P.3d 125 (Nev. 2014) (working throughout with the evidence and the damages 
the jury awarded on each count of the complaint).
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a jury could find that the California auditors invaded Hyatt’s priva-
cy, destroyed his peace, and intentionally inflicted the alleged 
emotional distress.
Conceivably, Hyatt’s case could have been pleaded as one of 
constitutional tort. Intentional infliction of harm by a government 
official, in my view, is unconstitutional.61 Perhaps, at a stretch, it 
was an unconstitutional search within the broader reaches of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. It could have been pleaded, 
I suppose, as an extension of the constitutional right of privacy, 
although that has been deployed mostly in aid of family autonomy. 
But the gravamen of Hyatt’s complaint was an infliction of emo-
tional distress, a state common-law tort.
Now consider the legal position of the defendant of record, Cali-
fornia’s Franchise Tax Board, an arm of the state of California. 
Under the California Tort Claims Act62 (a typical workaround en-
acted to deal with improvidently enacted state immunity), the 
state’s government employees become immune. But the state itself 
waives its immunity, appears, defends, and pays any judgment. 
That is a mechanism roughly analogous to that of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act,63 and, like that statute, it is also available in some cases 
of intentional tort, such as Mr. Hyatt’s.
There may have been some confusion among the judges and 
lawyers throughout this Nevada litigation, not only about the Cali-
fornia Tort Claims Act but also about California’s additional sepa-
rate special statutory immunity for its tax collectors, the Franchise 
Tax Board and its agents.64 California law immunizes California’s
tax collectors, confiding complaints against them to their adminis-
trative agency, the Franchise Tax Board. But this latter immunity 
61. The Supreme Court has carved out exceptions. The Court reasons that some inten-
tional torts by a government official are best left to state law—libel, for example. Paul v. Da-
vis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 810–810.8 (West 2012) (dealing with the liabilities in tort and 
contract of California’s administrative agencies); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 900–998.3 (West 
2012) (California Tort Claims Act); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 860.2 (West 2012) (California’s lim-
ited immunity for tax officials).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), as amended by the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (dealing with 
ordinary common-law torts by federal workers in the course of their employment). The 
Westfall Act, inter alia, codifies the general rule that the Federal Tort Claims Act has no ex-
traterritorial effect. In my view, a little further thought would have cautioned Congress 
against this codification. The interests of the United States in sensible management of ordi-
nary government torts are heightened by our need to maintain good foreign relations when 
an American civilian officer commits a tort causing injury abroad.
64. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 860.2 (“Neither a public entity nor a public employee is lia-
ble for an injury caused by: (a) Instituting any judicial or administrative proceeding or ac-
tion for or incidental to the assessment or collection of a tax. (b) An act or omission in the 
interpretation or application of any law relating to a tax.”).
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applies only to disputes over the calculation and amount of taxes 
owed. It has no bearing on a question of tort liability.65
The Nevada court apparently assumed that California’s waiver of 
immunity under its Tort Claims Act was effective in Nevada, just as 
it would have been at home in California, immunizing the auditors 
in the case and putting the state itself in their place as the defend-
ant. The Californians apparently made the same assumption. In 
any event, California did not plead sovereign immunity in Nevada. 
Instead, California came up with an unconvincing argument that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada to give California 
the benefit of Nevada’s $25,000 cap on its own waiver of immuni-
ty.66 This argument was nonsense. The obligation of full faith and 
credit is an obligation concerning judgments. The obligation has 
long been understood as having little or no bearing on laws.67
Moreover, the Clause imposes on the forum an obligation to a sister 
state, not to the forum itself. In other words, the Clause requires 
that the judgment of a sister state be recognized and enforced at 
the forum state. Further, the Clause empowers Congress to deter-
mine the extent of that obligation.68 Congress has enacted the Full 
Faith and Credit Act, which provides that the scope of a judgment 
is determined by the law of the judgment-rendering state.69 Noth-
ing in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, or its implementing statute, 
requires a court to apply another state’s laws, and certainly nothing 
in these measures requires a state to apply its own law.70
65. See Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1133 (1986). In the Franchise Tax 
Board litigation in Nevada, the California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 800–810.8, 
900–998.3 (West 2012), may have been misunderstood among the welter of the Code’s vari-
ous exceptions and immunity provisions. The statutory scheme involves exceptions to excep-
tions and contains special immunities in tax cases. My reading is that the taxing agency, 
Franchise Tax Board, as an arm of the state, and the State of California itself, are each im-
mune to judicial adjudication of disputes concerning the tax itself and its computation. Liti-
gation over the tax and its computation is confided to the agency. See CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 860.2 (West 2012). But for torts by tax officials, having nothing to do with their calculation 
of taxes owed, the California Tort Claims Act governs. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 800–810.8 (West 
2012). Under this provision, California immunizes its officials, waives its own immunity, ap-
pears, defends, and pays any judgment.
66. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.031–.970 (2019).
67. On the inapplicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to laws (as opposed to 
judgments), see Justice O’Connor’s clarification of the point and Justice Stone’s view, infra 
note 76. See also Chief Justice Roberts to the same effect, infra note 89. For the classic expo-
sition of the position that nothing need displace the forum’s own policies, see Fauntleroy v. 
Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
68. U.S. CONST. art IV.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. For the early history and evolution of the Full Faith and Credit 
statute, before and after the initial Act of 1790, see the excellent study in Stephen E. Sachs, 
Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201 (2009).
70. See Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); Pac. 
Emp. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939).
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But by the time Franchise Tax Board reached the United States 
Supreme Court, California was not only making its spurious argu-
ment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause but also attacking Ne-
vada v. Hall, arguing that a state should not be permitted to haul a 
sister state into its courts. In 2003, in Franchise I, the Supreme 
Court sustained Nevada’s jurisdiction and remanded the case for 
trial.71 On this point of jurisdiction, Justice O’Connor’s Franchise I 
opinion for a unanimous Court was based on Nevada v. Hall.72
California argued, in the alternative, that Nevada v. Hall could 
be distinguished—that a tax audit, being part of tax collection, is a 
“core sovereign function” and that this distinguished the case from 
Nevada v. Hall.73 In oral argument, Justice O’Connor wondered 
whether driving a car on official business might be a “core sover-
eign function” just as well as conducting a tax audit.74 Justice 
O’Connor could have been helped here by recognizing that the 
act of driving a state car recklessly, however “core” a “sovereign 
function,” cannot be pleaded as though negligent driving were un-
constitutional. At least since the days of the Burger Court, a plead-
ing of a constitutional tort requires an allegation of intentionality.75
Moreover, the defendant in a constitutional case must be an offi-
cial, rather than an ordinary worker, an official with a power of gov-
ernmental action in some degree, and the official’s breach must be a 
breach of a constitutional duty. Bad driving by a government worker 
is not unconstitutional, whereas intentional mistreatment by a gov-
ernment official is.
In her opinion for the Court, Justice O’Connor also declined 
the invitation to “balance” competing state interests under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause in order to impose a particular state’s law 
on any case.76
71. Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488 (2003) (holding that, under Nevada v. Hall, Nevada could 
take jurisdiction over California, and nothing in the Full Faith and Credit Clause compelled 
Nevada to give California the benefit of Nevada’s $25,000 cap on Nevada’s own waiver of 
sovereign immunity).
72. Id. at 497. Among the other distinctions of Justice O’Connor’s opinion was her re-
fined understanding of the immunity tangle confronting the Nevada Supreme Court. She 
wrote, “The Nevada Supreme Court sensitively applied comity principles with a healthy re-
gard for California’s sovereign status, relying on the contours of Nevada’s own sovereign 
immunity from suit as a benchmark for its analysis.” Id. at 499.
73. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488 (No. 02-42), 2003 WL 
439743.
74. Franchise I, 538 U.S. at 498.
75. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (hold-
ing that a zoning ordinance with a discriminatory effect was not unconstitutional because 
there was no showing of discriminatory intent).
76. As Justice O’Connor pointed out, the Court had long ago “abandoned the balanc-
ing-of-interests approach to [a] conflict[] of law[s] under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”
Franchise I, 538 U.S. at 496 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) 
(plurality opinion); Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501
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The Nevada jury awarded Hyatt damages of nearly $500 million. 
Yes, a half-billion dollars. Nevada’s high court threw cold water on 
such enthusiasm. By the time the Nevada high court was through 
with the case, the jury’s award was reduced to a less unreasonable 
$1 million. The Nevada high court ruled that Hyatt had no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in certain features of the tax audit at 
issue, so damages for invasion of privacy were wiped out. In addi-
tion, there could be no recovery for mere negligence; the case was 
one of intentional tort. So the damages for negligence were wiped 
out. And in the interest of comity, the Nevada Supreme Court 
chose (in my view, properly) not to approve punitive damages.77
I pause to note that prohibition of punitive damages is the gen-
eral rule in cases against a government.78 For what it is worth, how-
ever, I should add that Congress specifically provides for punitive 
damages against the Internal Revenue Service for deliberate or 
reckless disclosures of private information.79 And in Hyatt’s case, 
there was such a claim, which was also disallowed by the Nevada 
Supreme Court.80 The Nevada high court also suspended further 
consideration of Hyatt’s chief claim, intentional infliction of emo-
(1939); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–19 (1985)). Indeed, ever since 1935 
it has been clear that there can be no obligation of full faith and credit to laws. The only 
obligation is to judgments. See Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547 (Stone, J.) (“A rigid and literal 
enforcement of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, 
would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state 
must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.”).
77. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 130 Nev. 662, 705 n.19 (2014) (denying punitive dam-
ages).
78. I note that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 
1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611, makes an appropriate exception to the rule against pu-
nitive damages in suits against government. The exception approves punitive damages 
against foreign state supporters of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A; see infra notes 114, 151, 225. 
Apart from that anti-terrorism exception, the more general rule of the Act provides that
a foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable 
for punitive damages; if, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law 
of the place where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been con-
strued to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be 
liable for actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary injuries re-
sulting from such death which were incurred by the persons for whose benefit the 
action was brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1606. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that “The United States shall be lia-
ble, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for 
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (emphasis added). Puni-
tive damages are unavailable in actions against cities. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 
453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 7431(c)(1)(B)(ii).
80. Hyatt’s allegation of “fraud” involved assurances of confidentiality by the California 
auditors, assurances on which he relied in supplying certain information. Franchise Tax Bd.,
130 Nev. at 669–70. Hyatt alleged that the California agents deceived him and that they 
“shared his personal information not only with newspapers but also with his business con-
tacts and even his place of worship.” Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1284 (2016).
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tional distress, mandating that on remand it be sent to the jury on 
corrected instructions.
Most remaining damages were remittitured, bringing recovery 
down to that more plausible million.81 What turned out to be im-
portant in all this was the Nevada high court’s instruction to the 
trial court that it need not give California the benefit of Nevada’s
cap on its waiver of immunity82—now amended to the still-less-
than-handsome figure of $50,000. This instruction, in my view, was 
quite sound. To apply the Nevada legislature’s protection for Ne-
vada to every other state in the Union would take the cap outside 
its rational scope, and in this case would needlessly impede effec-
tuation of Nevada’s tort policies as the place of wrongful conduct 
and injury.
Once again, California sought review in the United States Su-
preme Court. In this 2016 phase of the litigation (Franchise II), the 
eight-Justice Supreme Court83 split 4:4 on the question whether to 
overrule Nevada v. Hall and, thus, sustained Nevada’s jurisdiction.84
But in a strange opinion for the Court, Justice Breyer ruled, appar-
ently for the first time in American legal history, that a state is re-
quired to give full faith and credit to its own law.85 And thus, Neva-
da was required, irrationally, to give California the benefit of 
Nevada’s own cap on Nevada’s own waiver of Nevada’s own im-
munity. This limited California’s liability to $50,000.
Justice Breyer evidently was encouraged in his novel view of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause by his perception of “hostility” on the 
part of the Nevada courts.86 For this “hostility” point, Justice Breyer 
81. Franchise Tax Bd., 130 Nev. at 669. In 2015, in oral argument in Franchise II, Justice 
Sotomayor stated that recovery was then down to “$100,000” (query whether she meant to 
refer to the $1 million remaining in the case at that time, or whether the Court had been 
apprised that a settlement might have been reached in such an amount, or was under some 
misapprehension). Justice Sotomayor suggested that that sum was for “the attorneys.” Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 23, Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (No. 14-1175), 2015 WL 
9304859.
82. See Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1280.
83. On the eight-justice Court, see supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text.
84. Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1283. I note that, somewhat surprisingly, the Justices have 
been shifting back in forth in their views of these cases. Back in 1979, the liberal Justices had 
supported Nevada v. Hall, while three of the conservatives dissented. Both wings of the Court 
fell in with the unanimous opinion in 2003 in Franchise I. But in 2016, in Franchise II, the lib-
erals joined Justice Breyer’s opinion requiring Nevada to give California the benefit of Ne-
vada’s $50,000 cap on its waiver of immunity and finding “hostility” in the Nevada Supreme 
Court’s correct instruction to the court below not to apply the $50,000 cap. And the con-
servatives in 2016 were supportive of Nevada v. Hall, except for Justice Alito, who concurred 
in the judgment.
85. Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1280–81 (Breyer, J.) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause required Nevada to apply its own law).
86. Id. at 1281 (Breyer, J.) (noting “hostility” in the Nevada courts).
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cited the old case of Carroll v. Lanza.87 The Court in Carroll v. Lanza
had casually remarked that, in the presence of hostility, the forum 
might be required to apply a sister state’s law as well as to recog-
nize its judgments.88 The Court in Lanza did not say that in the 
presence of hostility a court could be required to apply its own law. 
Lanza did not require a state to do anything against its own policies 
and interests. To these clear understandings there is one vital ex-
ception—that a state must recognize and enforce the judgment of 
a sister state.89 There is no obligation to enforce sister state laws.90
Lawyers continue to argue for nonforum law under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, and the Court does not bother to correct 
them, but the Court will not apply the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
to resolve a conflict of laws. For the latter purpose, the Court will 
consult only what the Due Process Clause requires.91 The modern 
position, under the Due Process Clause, is that the law applied 
must be rational as to its source as well as its content92—that is, the 
law applied must be that of a state with a legitimate governmental 
interest in the application on the particular facts. There is no con-
stitutional requirement that, in a two-state case, an interested fo-
rum apply the other state’s law, even if the other state is also, on 
the particular facts, an interested one. As Justice (later Chief Jus-
tice93) Stone explained way back in 1938 in the Alaska Packers case,94
87. 349 U.S. 408 (1955) (Douglas, J.) (mentioning “hostility” as a possible exception to 
the obligation of full faith and credit. Id. at 413. But the Court found no hostility in that 
case. “[T]he State of the forum, is not adopting any policy of hostility to the public Acts of 
Missouri. It is choosing to apply its own rule of law to give affirmative relief for an action 
arising within its borders.” Id.
88. Id.
89. As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, dissenting in Franchise II on the issue of full 
faith and credit, the full faith and credit obligation is an obligation to a sister state, not to the 
forum state itself. Id. at 1284; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. In the Supreme Court, the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause is resignedly applied to laws when lawyers argue it on a choice-of-law 
point, but only to the extent that the Due Process Clause would require. Choice of law has 
long been solely under due process control since the 1930s. What due process requires in a 
choice of law is a rational basis—a legitimate governmental interest. The interested forum 
need never bow to another interested state’s laws. See Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident 
Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). See also leading cases to the same effect under both the 
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, infra note 91. The full faith and credit obli-
gation is to judgments, not laws. 136 S. Ct. at 1283–84 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
90. Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1283–84 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
91. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818, 823 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981); Pac. Emp. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 
U.S. 493, 501 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass’n, 294 U.S. at 547.
92. For the foundational case on the due process requirement of rationality in choices 
of law, see Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (Brandeis, J.). A similar perspec-
tive on Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Brandeis, J.), is offered in Louise Weinberg, A
General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057 
(2013).
93. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone was appointed Chief Justice, with the consent of the Sen-
ate, by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941. Stone served as Chief Justice until his 
death in 1946. Harlan Fiske Stone, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography
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to hold otherwise would produce the “absurd” result that in every 
two-state case the forum must apply the law of the other state but 
never its own.95
Perhaps Justice Breyer (understandably) was shocked by the 
amount of the jury’s original half-billion dollar award to Hyatt. 
Perhaps Justice Breyer simply did not believe the allegations of the 
complaint, the jury verdict to the contrary notwithstanding. Per-
haps he reacted negatively to Mr. Hyatt’s move to Nevada in obvi-
ous tax avoidance. But tax avoidance is legal, after all. And the 
right to move to another state surely is a cherished freedom our 
federalism affords all Americans. It is reflected in our “right to 
travel”—a right held to be protected by the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV.96
So it was that, as far as damages are concerned, the Court’s lib-
erals in Franchise II wound up favoring an abusive agency over an 
individual97 whose peace the agency had intentionally destroyed. 
But at least Nevada v. Hall was intact—the 4:4 split in the Court 
meant that Nevada v. Hall was let stand.98
In the final act in the drama, in Franchise III, the curtain opened 
on California doggedly fighting on to wipe out the last $50,000 of 
Mr. Hyatt’s jury award. At stake was not only the bare justice af-
forded Mr. Hyatt on the facts of outrageous government miscon-
duct as found by a jury. At stake also were the remedial mecha-
nisms that Nevada v. Hall and Franchise I had made available. If 
Nevada v. Hall fell, Franchise I would fall with it.
But now, in Franchise III, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was no 
longer available to California. The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
had furnished California’s constitutional argument in Franchise I in 
/Harlan-Fiske-Stone [https://perma.cc/T4TV-ZAYW]; LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER (1994), Table of the 
Justices, app. F, at F-1.
94. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 294 U.S. at 547. This language was later quoted by Chief Justice 
Roberts in his dissenting opinion in Franchise II. 136 S. Ct. at 1285 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
95. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 294 U.S. at 547; see also, e.g., Pac. Emps., 306 U.S. 493 (1939); 
cases cited supra notes 76, 88–92, 94.
96. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2; Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Zobel v. Williams, 457 
U.S. 55 (1982); cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 (1947).
97. This is not the first time the Court’s liberals have been protective of an abusive fed-
eral agency. One thinks, for example, of the regrettable case of Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541 
(2012) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous Court) (denying dependent children access to their 
Social Security support, in effect because they were born in vitro). In denying support to the 
children, the unanimous Astrue Court impoverished the entire family, in the teeth of the 
purposes of the legislation, enacted in the second trough of the Great Depression in 1938. 
For a possible explanation for the liberals’ occasional tolerance of illiberal outcomes, see
infra Part IX.
98. Justice Alito concurred without opinion.
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2003,99 and that argument had been victorious in Franchise II.100
The Supreme Court had given California’s tax agency all it had so 
implausibly asked for. There was nothing more that the Supreme 
Court could do for California in Franchise III under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.
However, California’s actual question had always been the ques-
tion whether one state could take jurisdiction over another. In 
Franchise III, California simply raised the question directly. There 
was nothing in the Constitution that seemed to answer that ques-
tion, yet some federal question was needed to gain Supreme Court 
review once more. In its petition for certiorari in Franchise III, Cali-
fornia adroitly posed the question as: whether Nevada v. Hall 
should be overruled.101 California had succeeded finally in raising 
the real question the earlier iterations of the case had attempted to 
raise. That is, should one state be allowed to take jurisdiction over 
another?
Justice Thomas, writing for a slim conservative majority in Fran-
chise III and under the necessity of explaining why the Court’s an-
swer was “No,” was in the same quandary in which California’s legal 
team had found itself. The Court could not overrule Nevada v. Hall
without finding some reason for doing so in the Constitution, 
preferably, or in some federal statute. With full faith and credit out 
of the case, Thomas needed to find some other ground for the 
Court’s decision. He could not rely on the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Due Process Clause, not in this case. A defendant is not 
denied due process simply because he comes within the jurisdic-
tion of a court. A defendant state that has waived immunity cannot 
credibly argue that jurisdiction over it, and nothing more, violates 
the Due Process Clause. At all events, the unvarnished question of 
state immunity in state-law cases in state courts would seem to be re-
served to the states, within the meaning of the Tenth Amendment, 
since the Constitution nowhere delegates it to the nation.102 As Jus-
tice Breyer would point out, dissenting in Franchise III (in some 
99. Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003).
100. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979). Full faith and credit is owed to judgments, 
not laws. Lawyers often get this wrong, but the Court traditionally decides questions so ar-
gued by considering the rational bases—governmental interests—supporting the choice of 
law, exactly as it would decide them under the Due Process Clause. The forum is always free 
to apply its own law and policy, but due process requires that the application be within the 
law’s rational scope. Nevada’s waiver of immunity up to the amount of its statutory cap can-
not waive any other state’s immunity or cap any other state’s waiver. Construction of law, as 
well as choice of law, as well as application of law—all must be rational. See Louise Weinberg, 
A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057 
(2013).
101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (No. 14-1175), 
2015 WL 1346455.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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tension with his views in Franchise II), “Compelling states to grant 
immunity to their sister states would risk interfering with sovereign 
rights that the Tenth Amendment leaves to the states.”103
With no constitutional texts on which to draw, what was left to 
Justice Thomas was the massive body of Supreme Court cases ex-
panding state sovereign immunity. He had at his disposal the re-
searches and arguments made in those prior cases. We will have a 
closer look at his opinion shortly. Here, it is sufficient to say that 
Justice Thomas held, for the Court, that Nevada v. Hall was over-
ruled, and that the Constitution requires every state court to bow 
to the immunity of every other state.104
In August 2019, Franchise III was back in the Nevada courts. In 
view of the overrule of Nevada v. Hall, the Nevada Supreme Court 
had no alternative. It remanded the case to the court below for va-
catement of Mr. Hyatt’s judgment.105
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORT AND ORDINARY TORT:
TWO DIFFERENT WRONGS, TWO DIFFERENT REMEDIES
It will be helpful here to limn out the two novel, serviceable, but 
very different remedial mechanisms deployed by the trial courts in 
our two cases.
We have seen that, in the Franchise Tax Board litigation, the Su-
preme Court had before it a case very different from the case of 
Nevada v. Hall. It is not the only salient difference between them 
that Franchise Tax Board grew out of a “core sovereign function,”106 a
tax audit, while Nevada v. Hall grew out of a two-car collision, a 
road accident. An equally important distinction between the two is 
the fact that the tort in Franchise Tax Board, unlike the tort in Neva-
da v. Hall, was intentional. Deliberate misconduct by a government 
official, when causing injury or threatening to cause it, in my view 
is unconstitutional.107 Furthermore, in Nevada v. Hall the offending 
driver was a worker, with some quotidian job to do, whereas in Fran-
chise Tax Board, the offending auditors were officials, capable of 
governmental action. The case against the worker will be for some 
103. Dean Chemerinsky raised the point in oral argument, but it met with no particular 
interest. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 31, Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No. 
17-1299), 2019 WL 144815.
104. Franchise III, 139 U.S. at 1498 (Thomas, J.) (ruling that “[t]he Constitution implicit-
ly strips States of any power they once had to refuse each other sovereign immunity”).
105. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 445 P.3d 1250 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished disposition).
106. See Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003) (noting that a tax audit might not qualify 
as a “core sovereign function” when it was as abusive as Hyatt’s).
107. But see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), supra note 61 and accompanying 
text.
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common-law tort, but the case against the official, when for inten-
tional injurious misgovernance, can be pleaded as a breach of con-
stitutional duty.
These differences suggest that the remedial options the Court 
struck down as unconstitutional in Franchise III 108 had been usefully 
closing not one but two different remedial gaps of some conse-
quence in our adjudicatory system. These would have furnished fo-
rums for litigation of the interstate torts of government workers 
and the intentional interstate torts of government officials, respec-
tively. The former is generally pleadable under state common law; 
the latter is generally pleadable under the Constitution.
The two cases did share valuable features. In both cases, state law 
had immunized the state employee, protecting her from damages 
that she could not pay. In both cases, state statutes immunized the 
state’s employees and waived state immunity. And in both cases, the 
state itself appeared and defended. In both cases the courts were 
familiar with such arrangements and comfortable with them. The 
reader will recognize at once the typical workings of tort claims 
acts.
A. Nevada v. Hall: A Non-Federal Interstate
Tort Claims “Act” at Common Law
With Nevada v. Hall, interstate government torts in cases of per-
sonal injury, previously in a legal no-man’s-land, became actionable.
This was a great achievement of the common law. Utilizing state 
common law, Nevada v. Hall was functioning, in effect, as an inter-
state non-federal tort claims “act” at common law, analogous to the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act109 and like typical “little” state tort claims 
acts.110
108. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1490 (2019) (Thomas, J.) (“This case, now before us for 
the third time, requires us to decide whether the Constitution permits a state to be sued by a 
private party without its consent in the courts of a different state. We hold that it does not 
and overrule our decision to the contrary in Nevada v. Hall.”) (emphasis added and citation 
omitted).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
110. For a useful chart describing the parameters of state tort liability for each of the 50 
states, see State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT &
LEHRER, S.C. (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02
/STATE-SOVEREIGN-IMMUNITY-AND-TORT-LIABILITY-CHART.pdf [https://perma.cc
/QT97-M64D]. The foregoing chart, though quite comprehensive and detailed, is neverthe-
less limited in an important way. It often happens that a statute of immunity contains a 
clause that excepts the provisions of other legislation. It is often in this other legislation that 
state liability is made plain. On the other hand, the chart’s inclusion of caps on damages 
also will reveal the fact of liability, where the statutory scheme, at first examination, appears 
to be one of immunity. Assuming the correctness and currency of the chart, apparently 
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A tort claims act usually protects government workers, immuniz-
ing from liability a government employee who has committed an 
ordinary tort when acting within the scope of her employment. 
State mail-room clerks, truck drivers, and secretaries cannot easily 
pay damages. When a claim against such a worker is for personal 
injuries or wrongful death, the sums involved cannot be collected 
as a practical matter. Such workers are substantially judgment-
proof. It would be a nightmare for them to be made judgment 
debtors, in effect for life, or to have to seek relief in bankruptcy. 
Nor can workers do their jobs very well if stressed by having to 
mount a defense they cannot afford and by the threat of a judg-
ment for damages they cannot pay. A tort claims act protects the 
government worker from all of this, remitting her, for any disci-
pline or penalty, to the internal affairs desk of her office. The gov-
ernment, in effect, acknowledges its responsibility of supervision 
and training and, in turn, is encouraged to exercise those powers
more effectually.
Even when a state statute will permit suits against state employ-
ees for their ordinary torts in the course of their employment, the 
state typically will indemnify the employee,111 or it will provide 
course-of-employment liability insurance. Insurance can insulate a 
state from fully absorbing the costs of a particular accident and 
avoids letting the risk fall on the low-paid employee, which, as a 
practical matter, will actually fall on the injured party. The costs of 
insurance are spread across the public in a state’s current budget. 
The insurance company settles and, when necessary, comes in and 
defends.
The wisdom of such mechanisms becomes even plainer as one 
recognizes that, in this way, access to courts and to justice is pro-
vided—the injured party is given a chance to prove her case. Yet, 
even if she succeeds, she is afforded only the same rights—or al-
most the same rights—that she would have had in a similar action 
against a private defendant.112 Thus, the costs of her own injury will 
some twenty-nine states have tort claims acts with varying limits and qualifications. Almost all 
remaining states appear to have functionally equivalent remedial mechanisms.
111. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 885 (2014) 
(concluding that “[g]overnments paid approximately 99.98% of the dollars that plaintiffs 
recovered in lawsuits alleging civil rights violations by law enforcement”).
112. The important paradigm is provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act, which requires 
application of the law of the state where the wrongful act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 
1346(b). This was Congress’s attempt to ensure that a plaintiff under the Act would have the 
same rights under state law as she would have enjoyed in an action against a private defend-
ant. By use of the word “state,” an exception was made for cases that otherwise would have 
been governed by foreign law; accidents abroad are not covered. This exception is now codi-
fied by the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). At the time of the original enactment of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, every state in the Union applied the law of the place of injury to a 
tort claim. That might not be the same as the place of “act or omission,” the law of which is 
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not fall on the plaintiff and her innocent dependents as they would 
in the absence of a tort claims act. In some cases costs would also 
be borne by unpaid medical services or local charities. Such dys-
function would be the consequence of an attempt to impose liabil-
ity on a state wage worker in the absence of a tort claims act. The 
states typically achieve more orderly, commonsense management 
of their employees’ torts. Under a typical tort claims act, the state 
itself, waiving its formal immunity, settles the claim or comes in 
and defends and pays any judgment.113 The plaintiff has her day in 
court and her chance to be compensated in damages for her inju-
ry. This is the needed mechanism Nevada v. Hall was supplying in 
cases of interstate government tort, cases in which the injurer was a 
nonresident government worker.
What about runaway juries? In the analogous statutory schemes, 
a runaway jury is constrained by the typical proscription of punitive 
damages against government.114 Some of the relevant statutes fur-
ther limit damages to economic losses only or to “actual” damages, 
which can be defined to eliminate grief or suffering.
The mechanism of a tort claims act has clearly proved its worth. 
Twenty-nine states,115 California116 and Nevada117 among them, have 
enacted their own tort claims acts. Neither statute was applicable in 
these cases. The home state is under no duty to apply the other 
state’s law, and the home state’s law is inapplicable to the other 
state’s workers. In Nevada v. Hall, California’s tort claims act was a 
required by the statute. Thus, a statute intended to treat the victim of a federal worker’s tort 
exactly the way she would be treated in an ordinary state-law case, was turning out, in a two-
state case, to shunt her case into some other state’s law. The Supreme Court straightened 
this out in Richards v. United States. 369 U.S. 1 (1962) (holding artfully that Congress’s refer-
ence to the state of wrongful act or omission was a reference to that state’s whole law, includ-
ing its choice rules). This renvoi got the statute back to the place of injury. The default position 
under the proposed Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws is the place of conduct, not 
necessarily the place of injury. It is a plausible choice, and the better choice from a regulato-
ry point of view; but if widely adopted it will undo the benefit of Richards, to the extent 
courts still are applying the place-of-injury rule, in securing the same rights to the federal 
plaintiff that she would have enjoyed under state law—as Congress intended. Notwithstand-
ing the complexities of modern approaches to choice of law in tort cases, it seems fair to say 
that, for better or worse, the law of the place of injury remains the predominant choice.
113. Thus, tort claims acts are a roundabout way of providing respondeat superior against 
government, when case law has balked it. For a fine recognition of this situation and a rec-
ommendation that respondeat superior be restored outright to defeat government immunity, 
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933 
(2019).
114. For statutory shielding of sovereign entities from punitive damages, see Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, proscribing punitive damages; Foreign Sovereign Immun-
ities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606, same; and compare Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 131 
(Nev. 2014), in action defended by the state of California, state supreme court in another 
state disallowing punitive damages in the interest of “comity.”
115. On the 29 states, see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
116. CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 810–996.
117. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.010–41.970 (2019).
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regulation of California employees and did not apply to Nevada’s
employee. California’s waiver of sovereign immunity could not ra-
tionally be construed to insulate Nevada from liability. Similarly, in 
Franchise Tax Board, Nevada’s immunity rules could not apply to 
California and California’s law was not mandatory in Nevada.118 But 
both states’ courts treated the cases in their customary way as 
standard tort claims act cases.
Nevada v. Hall, then, was providing an obviously useful and even 
necessary adjunct to justice, extending to the interstate case the 
usual methods of litigation of ordinary tort claims by government 
workers. It would seem to be well, from either conservative or lib-
eral points of view, that some such commonsense path be laid for 
orderly administration of civil cases of this kind, in interstate as 
well as intrastate cases.
B. Franchise Tax Board: A Non-Federal Interstate Civil Rights “Act” at 
Common Law
With Franchise I, interstate constitutional torts, previously in a le-
gal no-man’s land, became actionable. I say “constitutional” because 
intentional injurious misconduct by a government official within 
the scope of her office will often be pleadable as a violation of the 
Constitution, although Franchise I was pleaded as an ordinary tort. 
Thus, Franchise I was another great achievement of the common 
law, one which Nevada v. Hall had made possible.
What about the Civil Rights Act? It is customary to plead inten-
tional injurious misconduct by a state official under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871.119 True, the Supreme Court has held that a state is not 
a “person” within the meaning of the statute,120 but that rule is a 
party-of-record rule only. An officer suit pleaded in the officer’s
individual capacity will defeat that rule.121 The greater difficulty is 
that civil rights actions have become virtually unenforceable any-
118. A state’s legislature does not legislate for all states but only its own. A Nevada speed 
limit is hardly intended to apply on a California road, and Nevada’s state immunity cap can 
hardly be bestowed on California. The Nevada Supreme Court was correct in pointing this 
out to the court below on remand. It explains why Justice Breyer was incorrect in finding 
hostility in Nevada’s doing so, particularly since the same court disallowed punitive damages 
and threw out the bulk of ordinary damages in the case.
119. Today the substantive part of the Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
120. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1989).
121. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25–31 (1991); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 
(1974).
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way, under such doctrines as so-called “official” or “qualified” im-
munity.122
Ultimately, the Franchise Tax Board litigation is best read as if the 
courts and parties in that case were applying defendant Califor-
nia’s tort claims act, which waived state sovereign immunity.
C. A Background Case.
Armed with the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence, Justice 
Thomas was content to take the question as posed in California’s
petition for certiorari123—the vague but broad question whether the 
Constitution permits a state to take jurisdiction over another state. 
And he had, for this broad question, a surprisingly broad answer. 
His answer would not only upend Nevada v. Hall but every other 
case against a state—not only in a sister state but even in a state’s
own courts.124 After Franchise III, it becomes quite possible to argue 
that a state is protected from all litigation by federal sovereign im-
munity.125
122. In the midst of world-wide protests over the killing of George Floyd, who died with 
an officer’s knee on his neck long after his pleas for breath had ceased, the Supreme Court, 
in a supreme act of disregard, on June 15, 2020, denied certiorari in four cases seeking recon-
sideration of qualified immunity. See Qualified Immunity Cases Are Rejected, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 
2020), at A2. For an influential extensive critique of the defense of qualified immunity, see 
Thompson v. Clark, No. 14-CV-7349, 2018 WL 3128975, at *6–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (Weinstein, 
Sr., J.); see also the fine portfolio work of Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 
COLUM. L. REV. 309 (2020); Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, 114 NW.
U. L. REV. 1101 (2020); and Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018). The leading case today remains Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 815 (1982). Harlow departs from the earlier police defense of good faith and prob-
able cause, ruling, rather, that a government actor is immune if a reasonable such officer 
could not have known that her conduct was in violation of “clearly established” law. In prac-
tice, after further development, this has come to mean that the plaintiff must find some pre-
vious precedent establishing that the same conduct was unconstitutional. But what two cases 
were ever the same? Worse, qualified immunity became litigable only pretrial, to save the 
officer the burden of meritless litigation, thus ousting the plaintiff of the right to trial by jury 
on the one issue that has become dispositive. All this dysfunction is attributable to the Su-
preme Court, fantasizing that a police officer must be spared the burdens of litigation and 
judgment, when in fact the defendant officer will be indemnified, or the city will waive im-
munity and defend instead. But see Daniel Epps, Opinion, Abolishing Qualified Immunity Is 
Unlikely to Alter Police Behavior, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/06/16/opinion/police-qualified-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/JG34-T4TT] (conclud-
ing that abolishing qualified immunity will not improve police behavior because police of-
ficers are indemnified for their liabilities in over 99% of cases).
123. For California’s petition for certiorari, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
124. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019).
125. Perhaps we should not be too surprised by Thomas’s sweeping conception of state 
immunity. Consider the fact that suit against any federal official for constitutional tort has 
become unavailable as a practical matter. In effect, there seems to be immunity—impunity, 
in fact—for federal officials violation the Constitution. It has been decades since the Su-
preme Court has approved a Bivens suit. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (making cognizable at common law a suit against a 
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Lurking in the background for Justice Thomas was the Court’s
seriously wrong 1999 decision in Alden v. Maine.126 That case made 
legal history by extending federal sovereign immunity to a state in 
its own courts, thus blocking state enforcement of an act of Con-
gress, as well as flouting the Supremacy Clause, contradicting state 
statutory waivers of immunity, and earning “the condemnation and 
resistance of scholars.”127 The Court did this for the purpose of sav-
ing the states from having to conform to federal labor law, thus 
stripping state government workers of those protections—such as 
the minimum wage, maximum hours, and safe and healthful work-
ing conditions. In order to accomplish this, the Alden Court, in ef-
fect, extended its untethered jurisprudence on the Eleventh 
Amendment to state courts.
Specifically, Alden licensed a state to withhold its own workers’
pay for work that the state had required them to perform after 
hours. This wage theft was a violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act128 and the Supremacy Clause. How could wage theft be a legit-
imate state interest? How could a state’s disregard of an act of 
Congress and the Supremacy Clause be lawful? How could it be 
sound policy to permit a state to strip its workers of the protections 
of federal labor law for the few personal hours their job leaves to 
them to enjoy? The employer may pitilessly demand overtime labor 
federal official to enforce the Constitution). Bivens is the federal analog to the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871, codified as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 1983. This last term, in Hernandez v. Mesa,
140 S. Ct. 735, 750 (2020), the Supreme Court refused to furnish a Bivens remedy for the 
deliberate killing of a Mexican boy cowering behind a pillar on the Mexican side of the bor-
der, by a United States border patrol officer shooting from the American side. This, not-
withstanding its approval, decades earlier, of a Bivens action for survival (and, by implica-
tion, wrongful death), in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). See also Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (holding wrongful death cognizable in admiralty, per-
haps the first non-statutory action for wrongful death in American legal history). Instead, 
the Hernandez Court held that the Mexican family could not have access to Bivens because 
“special factors counsel[ed] hesitation.” Cf. Bivens, 402 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J.) (noting in 
passing that Bivens presented no “special factors counseling hesitation”). This casual remark 
has mushroomed into an all-purpose defense that invariably defeats a Bivens action when it 
gets to the Supreme Court. Chief among the irrational arguments brought to bear on Her-
nandez v. Mesa was the argument that to allow the Mexican family to sue could cause friction 
in our foreign relations, and thus the case had to be confided to the executive branch. This, 
although Mexico had filed a brief urging that the family be allowed to sue in the United 
States. Brief of the Government of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of the Petitioners, 140 S. Ct. 735 (No. 17-1678), 2019 WL 3776030. As for confiding such a 
case to the executive branch, consider that there had been a refusal to prosecute officer Me-
sa and then a refusal to extradite him. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 755 (stating that prosecution 
had been declined); id. at 740 (stating that Mexico’s request for extradition had been de-
nied).
126. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
127. Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 953 (2000); see also Su-
zanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2000); Louise Weinberg, Of 
Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113 (2001).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 207.
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for all of a worker’s waking hours and more. But the law provides 
that the employer must pay for such a demand. The statutory wage 
is time-and-a-half for overtime.129 It was this essential protection, 
worked for and earned, that, in Alden, Maine was held free to deny 
its overworked probation officers.130 Of course, in light of the Su-
premacy Clause, state-law immunity could not furnish a defense to 
a federal claim in either set of courts. This was federal sovereign 
immunity for a state.
In Franchise III, Alden was lighting the path for Justice Thomas. 
He could see his way clear, relying on the federalized sovereign 
immunity in federal cases in federal courts (tracing back to the 
leading case of Hans v. Louisiana), to applying that immunity in 
state courts, following the path marked out by Alden v. Maine, even 
when that path now led to a state-law case. Ironically, however, Jus-
tice Thomas could not rely on Alden, notwithstanding its novel be-
stowal of federal immunity in a case against a state in its own 
courts. He could not rely on Alden because the Alden Court had 
specifically saved Nevada v. Hall. Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
Alden Court, had distinguished trial in the courts of another state 
from trial in a state’s own courts.131
Nor was there anything in the Constitution that answered the 
question posed. Justice Thomas could only refer vaguely to “the 
Constitution,” without pointing to any particular constitutional 
clause, and without referring to Alden as a precedent, to bestow on 
state government defendants the new federal sovereign immunity 
first seen in Alden. In Franchise III, however, this is not only a feder-
al immunity in state courts, but also, for the first time in American 
legal history, a federal immunity in state courts in state-law cases.
And this new immunity is held to be constitutionally required—
although not by anything in the text of the Constitution.132
Notwithstanding the interesting unavailability of Alden v. Maine 
for Justice Thomas’s use in Franchise III, Franchise III is best under-
stood, I think, as flowing from Alden v. Maine.133 Alden shields states 
129. Id.
130. Alden v. State, No. CV-96-751, 1997 WL 34981639 (Me. Super. 1997), aff’d, 527 U.S. 
706 (1999) (stating the approximate number of named plaintiffs as 65). The class itself of 
course would have been considerably larger.
131. Alden, 527 U.S. at 738–39 (Kennedy, J.) (“Our opinion in Hall did distinguish a 
State’s immunity from suit in federal court from its immunity in the courts of other States; it 
did not, however, address or consider any differences between a State’s sovereign immunity 
in federal court and in its own courts.”). For international understandings of a sovereign’s
immunity vel non in the courts of another sovereign, as well as analogous federal law on the 
point, infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.1. For the views of the American Law Institute on the 
point, see infra note 151 and accompanying text.
132. For Justice Thomas’s arguments, see infra Section III.A.
133. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (notoriously holding, notwithstanding the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act’s provision of time-and-a-half pay for overtime work, 29 U.S.C. § 207, that a state 
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with federal immunity in federal-law cases in their own courts.134
Franchise III extends this federal immunity in two ways. First, feder-
al immunity now shields state defendants in another state’s courts. 
And second, it now shields all states, apparently, in state-law cases. 
(While it is possible that one or more of the state-law torts in Fran-
chise III could have been pleaded as a federal constitutional tort,135
none were. Recall that the Franchise Tax Board litigation was a case 
brought under the state common-law tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, among other state-law torts.) In one blow in 
Franchise III the Court’s narrow conservative majority deftly 
achieved two extensions of Alden.
D. Applying Modern Legal Theory to Our Two Cases
The Supreme Court’s neutral forum, its original jurisdiction, 
would not be very useful in cases like our two, in which a state is 
sued in a sister state by a private party. That is because the policies 
and interests of the two states in such cases are unlikely to conflict. 
These cases are in a configuration in which allowing the plaintiff a 
chance to prove his case will almost always respect the policy con-
cerns and advance the interests of both the concerned states. A 
simple interest analysis can demonstrate this.
In Franchise Tax Board, for example, Nevada’s own waiver of im-
munity with its monetary cap could not rationally be construed to 
make any other state liable for the small sum recoverable, nor 
shield any other state from greater liability. Both the waiver and 
the cap were about Nevada’s own liability. Nevada had no interest 
in applying its immunity arrangements to any other state.
On the other hand, California was clearly an “interested” state; it 
would want to shield its own officials from damages liability wher-
ever sued, and could do so rationally, under its own tort claims act. 
But its purpose in doing so is to open the state to liability. On this 
ground, the Nevada courts rationally could choose to apply Cali-
fornia’s waiver of immunity to California. This conclusion is under-
scored by the fact that California’s waiver would serve Nevada’s
own compensatory and deterrent interests, as the place of injury 
may not be sued by its own workers in its own courts for violation of an act of Congress). 
Time-and-a-half pay, costly as it may be, nevertheless importantly preserves the hard-won 
eight-hour day, and with it helps to protect workers, by separating their private hours from 
their workday, and compensating them in recognition of the importance of the separation, 
if they must yield their private hours to their employer.
134. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
135. See supra text following note 61, suggesting constitutional theories for Hyatt’s
common-law case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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and residence of the plaintiff. As the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged in Franchise II,136 Nevada, too, was an interested state because 
it was the place of both conduct and injury. Since Nevada’s com-
pensatory interests were not in conflict with the compensatory in-
terests underlying California’s waiver of sovereign immunity in tort 
cases, Franchise Tax Board was a no-conflict case. With the exception 
of the $50,000 cap on waiver with which Nevada burdened its cases 
of government tort, the laws of both states were concerned with 
the same goal: the intelligent management of injurious torts 
commmitted by government personnel.
It is ironic, then, that the useful remedies the Supreme Court 
struck down in Franchise III were in a configuration in which both
states’ interests were advanced by the litigation. The Supreme 
Court succeeded only in frustrating the actual governmental inter-
ests shared not only by these two states but by virtually all states.
With Nevada’s compensatory and deterrent interests in the case, 
the Nevada courts clearly had power simply to default to their own 
general tort law, as the Supreme Court, in effect, had held in Fran-
chise II. Here, I should explain that it has been understood for al-
most a century that, when confronted with an apparent conflict of
laws, the interested state always has power to vindicate its own in-
terests in its own courts, notwithstanding the views of other con-
cerned states. Democratic theory supports the primacy of the in-
terested forum’s own law. The citizens of the concerned state have 
not voted for other states’ legislators, nor have they chosen, unless 
their elected representatives have done so, to be governed by other 
states’ statutes and cases. In this perspective, common-law choice-
of-law rules that would authorize departures from the law of the in-
terested forum have been wrong in conception. Even enacted 
choice rules, when resulting in departures from the interested fo-
rum’s own law, are questionable. They may become arbitrary and 
irrational in their disregard of the forum state’s own substantive 
policies, and thus may raise constitutional concerns of due process.
Nor is there some general policy of interstate harmony and com-
ity that could justify a court in an interested state in withholding its 
own law when its own law would otherwise furnish justice in the 
particular case. There is little interstate systemic value in excusing 
injustice and licensing wrongdoing.
Perhaps the preceding interest analysis of our two cases is an 
oversimplification. Sophisticated variations may be discoverable. 
But I think not.137
136. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019).
137. For a reminder of the familiar reasons underlying the workarounds that defeat sov-
ereign immunity in virtually every state, see infra Section III.C.1 and Part VI.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, AMERICAN HISTORY, AND STATE 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. On Constitutional Structure
Nevada v. Hall is irreconcilable with our constitutional structure 
and with the historical evidence showing a widespread pre-
ratification understanding that states retained immunity from pri-
vate suits, both in their own courts and in other courts.
—Justice Clarence Thomas138
[I]f a federal court were to hold, by inference from the structure of 
our Constitution and nothing else, that California is not free in 
this case to enforce its policy of full compensation, that holding 
would constitute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the 
states—and the power of the people—in our Union.
—Justice John Paul Stevens139
In the Supreme Court’s current view, as elaborated by Justice 
Thomas in Franchise III, state sovereign immunity is embedded in 
the “structure” of the Constitution.140 This “structure” argument is 
essential to the Court’s holding, given the complete absence of 
corroborative constitutional text. The “structure” to which the 
Court refers, of course, is federalism.141 But our federalism does 
not make us a confederacy, intent on states’ rights. We are a Un-
ion. We are also a Nation. And our governing charter is not the Ar-
ticles of Confederation but the Constitution of the United States.
Certainly the Constitution assumes the existence of states, putting 
them under constraints and duties, and providing for their repre-
sentation in Congress. It is from this existence of the states, an es-
sential structural feature of the nation, that the Court leaps to the 
conclusion that state sovereign immunity is constitutionally re-
quired. But it is hard to see how the conclusion follows from the 
premise.
138. Franchise III, 139 U.S. at 1498.
139. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 446–47 (1979).
140. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding Congress without Article 
I power to abrogate state immunity).
141. For interesting perspectives on federalism as grounding state sovereign immunity, 
see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The International Origins of American Federalism,
120 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (2020). Bellia and Clark also comment on an earlier contribution 
by Ernest Young. Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1601, 1625 (2000).
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It is simply not true that the Constitution structures this country 
as a collection of “sovereign” states.142 The further argument that 
the “sovereign” states require immunity from liability for actual 
wrongdoing has no foundation at all.
The shared values and experiences of government at all levels in 
the United States is that the cities, counties, states, and the nation 
as well—evidently all, as a matter of course, hold themselves re-
sponsible for the injurious misconduct of their officials.143
1. Justice Thomas’s Cleverest Argument
Justice Thomas’s cleverest structural argument in Franchise III is 
that the Constitution strips the states of various powers of interstate 
diplomacy. From this questionable observation, Justice Thomas 
leaps to a non-sequitur, the conclusion that this diplomacy-stripping 
implicitly also strips the states of their power to deny each other’s
immunity. In Thomas’s words:
Article I divests the States of the traditional diplomatic and 
military tools that foreign sovereigns possess. . . . A State’s
assertion of compulsory judicial process over another State 
involves a direct conflict between sovereigns. The Constitu-
tion implicitly strips States of any power they once had to 
refuse each other sovereign immunity, just as it denies 
them the power to resolve border disputes by political 
means. Interstate immunity, in other words, is “implied as 
an essential component of federalism.”144
Justice Thomas’s point that the Constitution strips the states of 
military power and international diplomacy has little relevance and 
is not even true. How about the National Guard, and the state 
troopers? How about the informal ambassadors the states send 
abroad to flog up some business? Texas, for example, has been 
142. See infra Section III.B.
143. See infra note 246 on the death of Sandra Bland; and infra Part VI on state provi-
sions for management of torts occasioned by their employees and officers in the course of 
their employment.
144. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1498 (2019) (citing Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Ne-
vada v. Hall). See the fine analysis in Baude, supra note 27, explaining that sovereign im-
munity was a background postulate of the common law, not of the Constitution; interesting-
ly comparing the states’ power to deny immunity to sister states with the now more limited 
power of Congress to abrogate state immunity; and concluding that Nevada v. Hall was right-
ly decided.
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boosting itself abroad as a good sunny place in which to make mov-
ies.145 Nothing in the Constitution strips Texas of power to do this.
Justice Thomas’s conclusion that the Constitution strips the 
states of power to engage in interstate diplomacy has no objective 
correlative in actual experience. Interstate diplomacy is very active 
and successful. Cooperation among the Attorneys General is a fa-
miliar and impressive example,146 and the National Governors As-
sociation meets twice a year.147 The states have explicit constitu-
tional power to reach interstate compacts, with the approval of 
Congress.148
But even if this were not the reality and the states really had 
been stripped of their powers of interstate diplomacy, it hardly fol-
lows that they must be immune when on trial in courts other than 
their own. Rather, the Constitution creates a particular jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, to adjudicate actual 
interstate controversies in a neutral forum. Where a suit against a 
state is at the instance of a private party in another state, the Con-
stitution provides for federal adjudication of such a case in federal 
courts, a provision which would be honored and convenient, were 
it not for the Eleventh Amendment. As for private cases against a 
state in the courts of a sister state, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concern is that the state be liable, not that it be immune. The Four-
teenth Amendment is unconcerned with venue. Instead, the Four-
teenth Amendment places an obligation on every state to adjudi-
cate private suits against a state. The Fourteenth Amendment says, 
explicitly, that no state shall deprive any person of federal constitu-
tional rights.
2. On the Source of Law
Justice Thomas’s reasoning in Franchise III—that the Constitu-
tion strips a state court of the power to deny the immunity of a sis-
ter state—is not only demonstrably wrong; it also flies in the face of 
every rule of law on the subject of choice of law on sovereign im-
munity. Contrary to Justice Thomas’s views, it is the universal rule 
145. See the history of the Texas Film Commission at History: Texas Film Commission, OFF.
OF THE TEX. GOVERNOR, https://gov.texas.gov/film/page/history (last visited Nov. 26, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/53ZM-LQJK].
146. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, State Attorneys General as Agents of that, 
Police Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. 999 (2020).
147. See NGA Meetings, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/about/meetings 
[https://perma.cc/9D35-RHRR].
148. “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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that a sovereign defendant cannot be heard to declare itself im-
mune from the consequences of its own wrongdoing when it 
stands before the tribunal of another sovereign.
Nations are true sovereigns, and, like the states, they can enjoy 
sovereign immunity in their own courts. But even a nation cannot 
determine its own immunity in the courts of another nation. That is 
the universal rule. The question of immunity vel non of a sovereign 
in another sovereign’s court is one that only forum law can answer. 
Only in the absence of legislation at the forum, or absence of set-
tled case law, will there be room to consider whether to grant im-
munity as a matter of comity.
For example, in American courts—federal or state—in a suit, let 
us say, against France, it is not for French law or for France to de-
termine whether or not France is immune. American courts them-
selves, federal and state, have no power to consult French law on 
the question. In our courts, the national rules governing foreign 
immunities are codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
of 1976 (FSIA).149 In the Amerada Hess case,150 the Supreme Court 
held that the FSIA is the exclusive determinant of foreign sovereign 
immunity in all courts in this country, state or federal. For this rea-
son, our courts have little power to exercise comity or to consent to 
the immunity of a foreign nation. They simply must do whatever 
the FSIA says to do on the given facts.
The American Law Institute’s just-approved Restatement (Fourth)
of the Foreign Relations of the United States could say little that is mean-
ingful to add to this. As its reporters remark: “The project takes the 
general approach of Restatement Third. . . . Restatement Fourth also 
includes four new Sections, based on amendments to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). . . .”151 The Institute’s Restatement 
149. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611.
150. Republic of Argentina v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431 (1989) 
(holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is the exclusive referent on the 
question of foreign immunity vel non in either set of courts). The position is now under chal-
lenge in the Supreme Court. See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 
2018), cert. granted, No. 18-1447, 2020 WL 3578679 (2020).
151. See Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law: Sovereign Immunity, THE ALI ADVISOR,
http://www.thealiadviser.org/us-foreign-relations-law (last visited Aug. 31, 2020), referring 
to recent amendments of the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, excepting from 
immunity, inter alia, state supporters of terrorism. This section provides:
§ 1605A. Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state. (a) 
In general. (1) No immunity. A foreign state shall not be immune from the juris-
diction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise 
covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign 
state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudi-
cial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support 
or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or re-
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(Third) on Conflict of Laws, now in its “Tentative Draft No. 6,” is si-
lent on the issue of sovereign immunity.
The Nevada Court in the Franchise Tax Board litigation simply as-
sumed the same position, in this interstate case, that has always ob-
tained in international cases. This is the position that Congress and 
the ALI have taken and the civilized nations of the world have al-
ways taken, in transnational cases.
Although, in effect, Nevada accepted that, under California’s
tort claims act, California’s tax officials were immunized and that 
the state waived its own immunity, an equally plausible reading is 
that Nevada’s law, like that of every other state, simply provided no 
immunity for sister states. Nevada had all the power it needed to 
choose to hold California liable whether California was immune 
under its own law or not. The effect, however, would have been 
precisely the same as it would have been under the California Tort 
Claims Act—that is, California would have shielded its employees and 
the agency from liability, but waived its own immunity.
3. The Constitution’s Actual Structure
The actual structure of our Constitution refutes the Court’s
structural argument. In three majestic Articles, the Constitution 
sets out the national powers of Congress, of the President, and of 
the federal courts. The fourth Article is about the states, but it does 
not empower them. Rather, Article IV imposes duties upon them, 
in addition to the duties mentioned in Article I.152 The fifth Article 
makes it extremely difficult to amend any of this. And the sixth Ar-
sources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while 
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, as a practical matter, manages to im-
munize state supporters of terrorism at will. See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 
1403 (2018) (holding corporations immune from actions under the Alien Tort Statute, and 
thus holding immune Jordan’s national bank, in a case brought by victims of Palestinian 
terror). The bank is basically a state instrument and a known supporter of terrorism. See
Stephanie Clifford, Arab Bank Liable for Supporting Terrorist Efforts, Jury Finds, NY TIMES (Sept. 
22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/nyregion/arab-bank-found-guilty-of-
supporting-terrorist.html. But it is also a major part of Jordan’s economy and thus important 
to stability in the volatile Middle East. Apparently for this reason Israel did not file a brief in 
the case. Moreover, the current Court does not approve adjudication of international tort 
cases that cannot plead injuries within the United States. See, e.g., RJR-Nabisco v. European 
Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 
124 (2013).
152. For example, the Constitution imposes upon the states the duty of running national 
elections. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. Article IV imposes duties of full faith and credit to judg-
ments, of rendition, and of maintaining a republican form of government. Article VI impos-
es on every state official and judicial officer an oath of fealty to the Constitution. Article VI, 
paragraph 1, subordinates the states’ own constitutions, as well as their laws, to federal law.
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ticle contains a ringing statement of the supremacy of federal law, 
“anything” in the state constitutions and laws to the contrary not-
withstanding.153 Not content with this assertion of national suprem-
acy, the Framers introduced a separate paragraph in the sixth Arti-
cle, forcing every state officer and judge to swear to support the 
Constitution.154
The Tenth Amendment is indeed a grant of power to the states, 
but it is a grant of undefined residual power only. Indeed, the 
Tenth Amendment repeats the residual quality of state power pre-
viously acknowledged even in the Articles of Confederation.155 Un-
der the Tenth Amendment, only those powers not delegated to the 
nation by the Constitution are left for the states. The extent of 
these crumbs, this residuum, is somewhat dependent on Congress,
since Congress has the power to do anything that is “necessary and 
proper.”156
With the Supremacy Clause, these latter provisions, tempered by 
equality of state representation in the Senate, comprise the struc-
ture of federalism actually embedded in the Constitution. We can-
not derive from this structure a license to injure persons with im-
punity in the courts at the state where the tort occurs.
Nor can state sovereign immunity be found in any part of the 
Constitution’s text. The Eleventh Amendment, presumably the fons 
et origo of state sovereign immunity, is literally, as we have seen, on-
ly a rule of construction for a federal court’s diversity jurisdic-
tion.157 The text of the Eleventh Amendment has no relation to the 
153. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States 
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the 
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both 
of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to sup-
port this Constitution; . . . .”).
155. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II. The delegation clause of the Articles 
of Confederation differs from the Tenth Amendment’s delegation clause in two respects. 
First, under the Articles, a delegation of power to the nation had to be express. And second, 
a delegation of power to the nation was to be made by Congress, not by the Articles of Con-
federation itself. Under the Tenth Amendment, it is the Constitution, not Congress, that 
delegates power to the nation, and there is no requirement of explicitness.
156. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (ex-
pansively describing the implied powers of Congress granted by the Constitution’s Necessary 
and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, 
are constitutional.”).
157. In its entirety, the Eleventh Amendment reads: “The judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecut-
ed against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of 
any foreign state.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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classes of cases upon which the Court has been bringing it to bear 
for well over a century, a fact with which the Court seems increas-
ingly comfortable, substituting for the Eleventh Amendment, when 
needed, an all-encompassing background principle.
I would venture to suggest that the Eleventh Amendment itself is 
unconstitutional, notwithstanding the apparent contradiction in 
terms. In support of this conclusion, I note that the Amendment 
discriminates against nonresidents in the matter of access to feder-
al courts. That discrimination is at least problematic, and on that 
ground the Eleventh Amendment should have been declared ob-
solete and untenable long ago. That could have been done silently 
with simple disregard.
Justice Bradley, in doing away with one “anomaly” in Hans creat-
ed two others. First, he extended the Eleventh Amendment from 
the diversity jurisdiction to the federal-question jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts, but failed to extend it to the original jurisdiction or the 
admiralty jurisdiction, thus creating gaps which had to be filled 
years later.158
Second, and worse, Justice Bradley in Hans left the Eleventh 
Amendment applicable in federal but not in state courts. We know 
now that such an arrangement is unconstitutional. One of our 
greatest cases, Erie v. Tompkins,159 requires the identification of the 
sovereign whose law is applicable,160 and whichever law, state or 
federal, is held applicable on any point must then be applied, no 
matter whether the question arises in a state court or a federal 
court. Governing law must apply in both sets of courts or it is likely 
to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, from this perspective, 
has resolved the latter problem presented by Hans with Alden v. 
Maine and Franchise III. That would be a commendable improve-
ment but for the fact that what has been extended is universal fed-
eralized immunity. Although the extension of immunity to state 
courts puts paid to Justice Bradley’s anomalously narrow extension 
of the Eleventh Amendment, it does away with court access to jus-
tice for serious violations by a state of acts of Congress and even 
the Constitution.
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment, in its first Section, 
makes very clear that the states shall be liable, should they deprive 
158. See, e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (admiralty).
159. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
160. Id. at 79 (Brandeis, J.) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & 
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (“But law 
in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority 
behind it.”); see Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking 
Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057 (2013); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U.
L. REV. 805 (1989).
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any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, evidently would impose 
liability on the states, not immunity.
It would appear that the “structure of the Constitution” simply 
will not bear the weight of unreason the Supreme Court is heaping 
upon it.
B. On State Sovereignty
Disambiguation might be helpful in examining the concept of 
state sovereign immunity. So, let us turn, first, to the question of 
state sovereignty, while we postpone the further question of state 
immunity.
To what extent, since the structure of the Constitution is una-
vailing, can the states nevertheless be found to be “sovereign” on 
some more persuasive basis? In Alden v. Maine,161 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court, stated unqualifiedly that the sovereignty of 
the states both preceded and survived the Constitution.162 He re-
ferred vaguely to “structure” and “history” and “authoritative inter-
pretations” by the Court.163 In Blatchford v. Native Village,164 Justice 
Scalia stated unequivocally: “The States entered the federal system 
with their sovereignty intact.” But he also cited no authority for 
this. Similar declarations ex cathedra are conspicuous among the 
sources of modern “authority” for a re-imagined history.165 In this 
sort of pronouncement we see the modern Court painting a pic-
ture of sovereignty as an ancient and permanent attribute of every 
state. Is there any support for state sovereignty in our history?
161. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
162. Id. at 713. For the relation of this position to an opinion by Justice Brennan, see 
Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1113, 1128–29 (2001).
163. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
164. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
165. The modern rewritten history of state sovereignty is laid out in Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. 
South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (Thomas, J.), which held that a state has 
sovereign immunity from suit by the Federal Maritime Commission; Alden, 527 U.S. 706,
which held that a state has sovereign immunity from suit for violation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which held that Congress has no 
Article I power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment; that is, to require a state to comply 
with acts of Congress. (!)
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1. Colonial Times
The colonies were hardly sovereign. The only “sovereign” the 
American colonists knew was the King, the “Crown.”166 Even in the 
early years of the Revolution, the King was still appointing the co-
lonial governors and paying the salaries of the colonial judges.167 It 
is true that the colonies enjoyed a measure of self-governance, in 
part attributable to benign neglect by the Crown with respect to 
the colonies’ internal affairs. Some colonies had their own legisla-
tures and their own courts. But the highest colonial courts, with 
the important jurisdiction over taxation and ships, remained the 
colonial courts of the Crown, and these had to yield final judicial 
review to the Privy Council in London.168 The colonies’ most relia-
ble currency was the British pound.169 There could be no sover-
eignty for a former colony in these sorts of arrangements.
2. Union and Revolution 
Although there probably never was full-bore popular enthusiasm 
for revolution, George Washington would come to use a colony’s
local militia adroitly to report and acquire news, tend the crops, 
befriend defecting British soldiers, and do a little spying.170 Despite 
the want of enthusiasm in the countryside, and notwithstanding 
the growing differences between North and South, there was a real 
and increasing union of feeling and purpose in the colonies, even 
as they became increasingly self-governing. We see their approach-
166. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58 (2002).
167. See THE GOVERNORS OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES PRIOR TO 1750: AND OFFICERS OF 
THE HEREDITARY ORDER OF DESCENDANTS OF COLONIAL GOVERNORS (Franklin Classics 2018) 
(1890–1899).
168. See 1 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND (John Roche Dasent ed., Nabu Press 
2011) (1894); CARL UBBELOHDE, THE AMERICAN COLONIES AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1607-
1763 (John Hope Franklin & Abraham S. Eisenstadt eds., 1968); JOHN PALMER & BARON 
JOHN SINGLETON COPLEY LYNDHURST, THE PRACTICE ON APPEALS FROM THE COLONIES TO 
THE PRIVY COUNCIL: WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THAT HIGH COURT (Bib-
lioLife 2015) (1831); JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE 
AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1965).
169. See generally JOHN WRIGHT, THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATOR: OR, THE VARIOUS 
CURRENCIES OF THE BRITISH COLONIES IN AMERICA; AS WELL THE ISLANDS, AS THE CONTINENT
(Palala Press 2016) (1765) (describing the various currencies in common use in the first half 
of the eighteenth century in North America, and emphasizing throughout this extensive 
survey that the only currency acceptable everywhere was the British pound).
170. For recent colorful accounts, see STEPHEN R. TAAFFE, WASHINGTON’S 
REVOLUTIONARY WAR GENERALS (2019); and THOMAS B. ALLEN, GEORGE WASHINGTON,
SPYMASTER: HOW THE AMERICANS OUTSPIED THE BRITISH AND WON THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
(2007).
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ing Union in records of the Committees of Correspondence171 and 
the widespread development of such common endeavors as the 
forming of Committees of Safety;172 the storing of supplies; the dig-
ging of earthworks; the self-arming of the people; and the recruit-
ment, training, and uniforming of regiments from each colony as it 
sought independence.
Above all, in Philadelphia the Continental Congress began sit-
ting in the autumn of 1774, with delegates from twelve of the Brit-
ish colonies; this, our earliest Congress, reconvened the following 
spring with delegates from all thirteen colonies, to direct the con-
duct of the Revolution. And the colonies submitted to the sense of 
the Congress on the conduct of the War, throughout.173
The crucial point is that there were no “states,” whatever the 
unifying spirit reigning in the great rebellion, and however effec-
tual the instruments of self-government in the colonies. The Union 
was coming into being long before the birth of the states and long 
before the birth of the Nation.174 Abraham Lincoln said, “[t]he Un-
ion is older than the Constitution.”175 He could have said as well 
that the Union is older than the states. There was no state sover-
eignty, intact or otherwise, because there were no states before 
1776. There were only thirteen former colonies, each retaining the 
name of colony, plantation, or province.
3. The Birth of the States
We know when the states came into existence and came togeth-
er as a nation, both events occurring at the same time. We cele-
brate this birthday every July 4. On that date, in 1776, a most con-
sequential step for world history was taken. The Declaration of 
Independence was read aloud to the troops gathered in every city 
and town in the thirteen colonies and posted wherever the colo-
nists gathered in every city and town. On that date, July 4, 1776, 
the colonies ceased to exist as appendages of the Crown. The 
United States of America was born, free and independent, and was 
given its name, and the states were given their names as “states”
171. See generally EDWARD DAY COLLINS, COMMITTEES OF CORRESPONDENCE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1902).
172. See generally AGNES HUNT, THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES OF SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (Wentworth Press 2019) (1904).
173. See, for a fine modern account, JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL 
POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1976).
174. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95–168 
(1992).
175. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), https://avalon.law.
yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp [https://perma.cc/7VQT-8YNJ].
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and were born that day as “states in Union,”176 a coinage appearing
in passing in the 1869 case of Texas v. White.177
Thus, there could have been no state sovereignty with which the 
states entered the Union in 1776, because there were no states. 
There was no law, before that date, endowing the British colonies 
with sovereignty, or with statehood. The first such usage in a con-
stitutional sense occurs only with the Articles of Confederation of 
1781.
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in Franchise III, also locates 
the birth of the states in the Declaration of Independence of 1776. 
But he characterizes the states therein as each fully sovereign and 
independent. He quotes the final paragraph of the Declaration as 
securing this sovereignty. According to Thomas, the Founders 
there declared all the states to be “Free and Independent states”
with “full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, 
establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which 
Independent states may of right do.”178 Consulting international 
law, Justice Thomas concludes that independence from the Crown 
“entitled” the Colonies “to all the rights and powers of sovereign 
states.”179 This is adroit, but it will not do. It has no referent in the 
body of the Declaration of Independence, which is in the form of a 
letter to the King. The language to which Justice Thomas refers 
appears in the closing salutation of that letter, the equivalent of 
“Sincerely yours,” always followed by a signature. But even in the 
salutation, the independence declared on July 4 was, explicitly, the 
independence of the “union of states,” not of each state. The salu-
tation was offered by “the representatives” of the United States, by 
the authority of all its People, and in Congress duly assembled, not 
by the authority of the people of each state assembled in its indi-
vidual state house:
We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of 
America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the 
Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our inten-
tions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good Peo-
ple of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That 
these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free 
and Independent States. . . .180
176. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726 (1869).
177. Id.
178. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1493 (2019).
179. Id. (citing McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209 (1808)).
180. The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
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That salutation has been understood for 225 years, until Justice 
Thomas’s selective reading of it, as introducing the signatories to 
the letter, even referring to themselves as “these Colonies.” We 
know that the Declaration of Independence is the birth certificate 
of our independence as a nation from the mother country. We did 
not declare the independence of New Jersey.
Even Justice Kennedy, in his own ahistorical and regrettable 
opinions on sovereign immunity, Seminole Tribe and Alden v. Maine,
did not cite the closing salutation of the Declaration of Independ-
ence in support of his views.
The obscure McIlvaine case181 on which Justice Thomas also re-
lies for his unique reading of the Declaration’s salutation does not, 
in fact, support that reading. Several of the states had sought per-
mission from the Continental Congress during the revolution to 
declare themselves independent, and Congress gave its approval or 
not to each such supplicant state, depending on the then progress 
of the war. New Jersey was among those which were permitted to 
declare their independence.182 McIlvaine had nothing to say about 
the Declaration of Independence, because it really was about the 
independence of New Jersey. The case was not in the Supreme 
Court’s important appellate jurisdiction, but only in its original ju-
risdiction for cases against a state. It was not about sovereignty. Ra-
ther, it was about a grant of land located in New Jersey. In the 
course of the opinion, casual reference is made, in dating an event, 
to the date of New Jersey’s declaration of its own independence, by 
permission of the Continental Congress during the War.183
But McIlvaine does lend some support to to Justice Thomas’s ar-
gument. New Jersey’s petition to Congress for permission to de-
clare its own independence does mention sovereignty, and the 
terms of New Jersey’s request were simply repeated in Congress’s
grant of such permission.184 Justice Thomas goes very far in allow-
ing us to suppose this permission in the words of this particular 
approval, with its rote mention of sovereignty repeating the word 
used by New Jersey, somehow applied to all the colonies.
181. McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. 209 (1808) (cited in Franchise III, 139 U.S. at 
1493).
182. See Saving America’s Treasures: The Revolution in New Jersey, N.J. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://nj.gov/state/archives/eventsat.html [https://perma.cc/E9C5-46YE] (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2020).
183. McIlvaine, 8 U.S. at 212.
184. See Saving America’s Treasures, supra note 182.
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4. The Real Birth of State Sovereignty
The Articles of Confederation of 1781 was the first and only 
formal document that explicitly endowed the states with sovereign-
ty. Article II of the Articles of Confederation provided:
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independ-
ence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not 
by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United 
States, in Congress assembled.185
Moreover, by use of the word “retains,” the reader is led to be-
lieve that the sovereignty here declared preceded the Articles of 
Confederation. This declaration of state sovereignty preceded the 
ratified Constitution of 1789 by eight years. Adding the five years 
between Independence and the Articles of Confederation to the 
eight years of the Articles of Confederation, we have thirteen years 
in all. This seems a rather slender reed on which to support the 
current weight of federal case law relying on “early understand-
ings” of “state sovereignty.” But it is the eight years under the Arti-
cles that comprise the only years of constitutionally recognized 
state sovereignty in American history. That is, unless state sover-
eignty survived the Constitution.
5. The Rollup of Conventions
The origins of the Constitution lie in a rollup of little “conven-
tions” that led to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The cur-
tain opens on an interesting story. General George Washington, in 
retirement at his home at Mount Vernon, Virginia, is worrying 
about the increasing fractiousness among the states.186 In 1785, 
Washington was concerned enough about a serious interstate water 
185. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II. Notably, there is no mention in the 
Articles of Confederation of “immunity” from judicial process or anything else.
186. Back in 1754, Benjamin Franklin had invited delegates from the colonial assemblies 
to a convention at Albany to unify the colonists’ confrontation with the Indians and had 
there first proposed a continental Congress. When Franklin’s proposal came to nothing, he 
left for Great Britain where he served as an informal ambassador to the Crown for various 
American colonies. Twenty-five years later he returned in disgust with the Crown to back the 
Patriot cause. Franklin is sometimes credited with having brought the French and the 
French fleet to our shores, a decisive factor in the War. E.g., RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE 
FORGING OF THE UNION: 1781-1789, 208–17 (1987); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 186–87 (enlarged ed. 1992). The following account 
of the rollup of conventions that led to the Constitutional Convention is drawn mainly from 
MORRIS, supra.
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dispute to call a meeting at Mount Vernon, his house.187 Washing-
ton sent invitations to distinguished delegates to represent each of 
the three states concerned. Of those, two, representing Virginia 
and Maryland, rushed to his side.
Under the Articles of Confederation, an issue such as a dispute 
over water rights could be brought in a state court. But it was self-
evident that neither state could be content with litigation in the 
other’s courts.188 The Articles did provide for final independent de-
termination of such a dispute, but only by Congress.189 The Articles 
of Confederation made no arrangement for national courts.
At this “Mount Vernon Convention,” George Washington 
backed James Madison’s idea of a convention of delegates from all
the states, to consider the inability of the nation under the Articles 
of Confederation to deal with interstate friction. Washington, more 
than ever the Father of our country, called for such a convention 
to be held at Annapolis the following year.
The “Annapolis Convention” was attended at the Colonial Court 
of Vice-Admiralty by invitees from five states.190 Anti-Federalists at 
the time feared a stronger central government as threatening a re-
newal of their experiences under the Crown. But at Annapolis, it 
was noted and conceded that the states were interfering with each 
other’s commerce, imposing their own tariffs, and authorizing 
their own currencies. Farmers in Western Massachusetts were even 
thought to be in rebellion.191 It was understood more clearly than it 
had been that, under the Articles of Confederation, the Nation 
had inadequate means of restoring order to the Union.
At Washington’s request, Alexander Hamilton prepared a report 
of the situation to be sent to Congress above Washington’s signa-
ture. Washington’s letter requested Congress to authorize a con-
vention of all thirteen states to be held in Philadelphia the follow-
ing summer. The convention was to be assembled for the purpose 
of amending the Articles of Confederation in order to impose 
187. On the Mount Vernon Convention, see MORRIS, supra note 186, at 249–52.
188. The Constitution provides the independent arbiter for interstate boundary and wa-
ter disputes that was lacking in the Articles of Confederation. Such disputes are handled by
the Supreme Court, in the original jurisdiction granted the Court in Article III. In suits 
against a state as defendant of record at the instance of a private party, the state is also af-
forded the dignity and impartiality of Supreme Court jurisdiction, but these sorts of cases 
are discretionary with the Court and are typically remanded to a federal district court for 
litigation. Both are to be distinguished from suits against a state officer at the instance of a 
private party, the typical shape of public-law litigation in courts of general jurisdiction.
189. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 2.
190. The attending delegates were from Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia. Maryland apparently did not choose to attend. See Annapolis Convention,
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com /event/Annapolis-Convention.
191. MORRIS, supra note 186, at 25–57.
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greater national order upon the states.192 All the state dignitaries 
attending the Annapolis Convention co-signed the Hamilton re-
port and sent it on to the Confederation Congress, which was then 
sitting in New York. After some delay, Congress approved the pro-
posal, with the understanding that the proposed Convention was to 
revise the Articles.
Thus, it was that the Constitutional Convention, with George 
Washington sitting at its head, was convened in Philadelphia in the 
hot July of 1787.193 The ostensible purpose was to improve upon 
the existing Articles of Confederation. It is commonly said that, at 
the Philadelphia Convention, those attending—some of the finest 
political thinkers in the country—put themselves to the task of 
writing a new constitution. But that is not quite what happened. 
The Constitution in many ways is a child of the Articles of Confed-
eration. Innumerable of the provisions of the Articles are pre-
served, often intact. But among the more drastic improvements is 
the Constitution’s total erasure of the Articles’ prime directive, en-
dowing each state with “sovereignty.”
From what has been said thus far, we can gather that the driving 
force behind George Washington’s stewardship, and behind the 
Constitutional Convention, remained the perceived need to sub-
ordinate the states to the nation.194 That the Constitution achieves 
this with every reference to national power, every reference to state 
duty, and every denial of state power, renders almost embarrassing 
the Supreme Court’s efforts to bedizen the states with a sovereignty 
the Constitution clearly denies them.
The Constitution creates the separate federal judicial power. It 
establishes our one Supreme Court. And it creates the Supremacy 
Clause,195 with the attendant duty of every state judge and officer to 
take an oath subordinating the state to the national will.196 Under 
the Constitution, the states exist within the Union but must shoul-
der certain responsibilities. They retain power over whatever the 
Constitution does not delegate to the nation. But the Constitution
strips away the power they had, under the Articles, when in Con-
192. Id. at 277, 280–81.
193. For George Washington’s roll-up of conventions, see Kate Mason Rowland, The 
Mount Vernon Convention, 11 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 369, 410–35 (1888); and Richard 
B, Morris, The Mount Vernon Conference: First Step Toward Philadelphia, THIS CONST.: A
BICENTENNIAL CHRON., Spring 1985, at 38–40.
194. MORRIS, supra note 186, at 257.
195. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
196. Id. at cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members 
of the several state Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United 
States and of the several states, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Con-
stitution. . . ,” including, of course, the laws enacted thereunder, and the Supremacy 
Clause).
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gress assembled, to delegate powers to the nation. Under the Arti-
cles, such delegations were not only to be made by the states 
through Congress, but must also be “express.” Under the Constitu-
tion, however, only the Constitution itself delegates power to the 
nation. Moreover, there is no requirement of explicitness. Implied 
powers, if their exercise is “necessary and proper,”197 are not pro-
scribed.
As for the sovereignty of the nation, Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained, in the great case of McCulloch v. Maryland,198 that the only 
sovereign that ordained and established the Constitution was “We, 
the People.” It certainly was not Them, the states. It is true, Mar-
shall acknowledged, that, to ratify the Constitution, We, the Peo-
ple, assembled in our several states. But, he continued, “where else 
should [We] have assembled?”199
How could even the limited state sovereignty briefly and divisive-
ly imposed on our Union by the defective Articles of Confedera-
tion survive a Constitution authored with the express purpose of 
defeating it? The Constitution forbids the states to take actions that 
true sovereigns can take and do. Although the Articles also with-
held some of those powers from the states, it is still worth noting 
that the Constitution prohibits states from entering treaties or alli-
ances, coining money, impairing the obligation of contracts, and 
granting titles of nobility.200 A state must obtain the approval of 
Congress before it can lay a tax on its own interstate or interna-
tional trade, and it must turn over to Congress the revenue from 
any such tax.201 States cannot take military action in times of war 
without the consent of Congress, unless there is some emergen-
cy.202 Obligations that even the Articles imposed on the states are 
maintained.203 The states must recognize and enforce each other’s
judgments.204 They must not discriminate against nonresidents.205
And they must render up prisoners (and slaves) who are wanted in 
197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing that Congress shall have power “[t]o make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof”). For Chief Justice Marshall’s description of the 
scope of this, the Necessary and Proper Clause, see supra note 156.
198. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
199. Id. at 403; see also WOOD, supra note 166 at 212 (suggesting that Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s identification of “the People” as sovereign may have had its roots in the previous dec-
ade, with the colonists’ wrath against the Crown, and in their emerging belief that Parlia-
ment, being representative, might be the truer expression of popular will).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
204. Id. § 1.
205. Id. § 2.
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another state on request.206 What sovereign in the world would suf-
fer such nullification of essential sovereign powers?
Nothing in our federalism or any other feature supposedly em-
bedded in the Constitution’s “structure” repeals the Constitution’s
actual structure.
In short, it is simply not possible to read state sovereignty into 
the Constitution. The Constitution overwhelmingly subordinates 
the states to the national will, as contemplated in the plan of the 
Convention.
6. The Death of State Sovereignty
The question, then, is whether state sovereignty, introduced by 
the Articles of Confederation, could have survived its apparent bur-
ial by the Constitution. The Supreme Court’s answer today is an 
emphatic “Yes.”207 History’s answer is an emphatic “No.” The Con-
stitution remains our fundamental law, and nothing that contra-
dicts it can survive. Nor can ground rules more attributable to the 
Articles of Confederation than to the Constitution be validated by 
ritual incantation of the word “federalism.” The historically accu-
rate statement is that the states were to be more fully subordinated 
to the Nation in the plan of the Convention, and that intention is 
embodied in the Constitution of the United States. As We, the 
People, stated in our Preamble to the Constitution, at its very head, 
We ordained and established the Constitution “in Order to form a
more perfect Union.”208 There is no intention to form more sovereign 
states. Nothing in our federalism erases this central purpose of our 
fundamental law, this essential nature of our federalism—that it is 
a Union, not a confederation. Which brings us to the Civil War.
7. The Civil War 
In the recent Court’s discussions of the Founding, the Supreme 
Court reveals itself to be in a curious condition of forgetfulness. 
What about the Civil War? We had a great Civil War. Nostalgia for 
an antebellum period of states’ rights is too casual about the taint 
of slavery that darkens our history. It is disregardful of the election 
206. Id.
207. This was a question of importance for Justice Kennedy in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 US 44, 83 (1996). There, he insisted that preexisting state sovereignty, which Justice 
Brennan had declared trumped by the commerce power in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1988), had both preceded and survived the Constitution.
208. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
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of 1860. It is disrespectful of the sacrifice of those who gave “the 
last full measure of devotion” to save the Union and did save it. 
The result was a new, triply-amended Constitution.209 This rebirth 
of the nation, a second Founding, should have informed the Su-
preme Court in its thinking about state responsibilities.
In the antebellum period, Southern states had amassed surpris-
ing political power in Washington—surprising, given the South’s
much slower growth in immigration, industrial activity, and other 
indicia of likely political influence. Throughout the antebellum 
period, the South enjoyed seemingly inexplicable control of the 
Senate, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court. To Northerners, 
this was the mysterious “slave power” they could not fathom.210 But, 
whatever the source of the antebellum Southern ascendancy, by 
the 1850s it should have become obvious that Southern dependen-
cy on slave labor, and consequent debasement of poor whites 
(who, being unneeded, were often uneducated and unemployed), 
was standing in the way of the kind of mass immigration and indus-
trialization that Northern free states were experiencing. In conse-
quence, and notwithstanding the stratagems that had kept the 
South’s grasp on power in Washington, D.C., the South was losing 
the political power that, in a democracy, population must pro-
vide.211 The threat to the South of the loss of national political 
power became reality when Abraham Lincoln won the presidency 
in 1860, despite his absence from the ballot in ten Southern states. 
Southerners saw that they were losing control over national politics 
and feared that eventually the anti-slavery faction up North would 
destroy the Southern way of life.
The secession of the Southern states, half of our country, was 
not to be borne. The Nation fought back. Six hundred thousand 
Americans died. The United States of America won. The Confed-
erate States of America lost. Nothing in the existence of our states 
or our federalism unwins the Civil War.
But the Supreme Court can unwin it for us. The Supreme Court 
for some time has been laboring to subordinate the national will to 
the notion of “states’ rights” that the Civil War crushed, undermin-
ing the Constitution that the Court was created in large part to en-
force, protect, and defend. Why should restoration of John C. Cal-
209. For a fine recent account, see ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019).
210. For my analysis of the antebellum southern ascendancy, see Louise Weinberg, Dred 
Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 97 (2007) [hereinafter Weinberg, Dred 
Scott]. For my explanation of the Southern ascendancy, see Louise Weinberg, Luther v. 
Borden: A Taney-Court Mystery Solved, 37 PACE L. REV. 700, 753–63 (2017).
211. Weinberg, Dred Scott, supra note 210, at 111–12.
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houn’s antebellum understandings—restoration, in effect, of the 
Articles of Confederation—be a project of our Supreme Court?
No state sovereignty could have or should have survived the na-
tion’s victory in the Civil War. The Fourteenth Amendment is the 
most precious fruit of that victory, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
says: “No state shall . . . .” No state shall deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law, or of the equal 
protection of the laws, or of the privileges and immunities of citi-
zenship. The logical implication of this, and it has been so under-
stood since 1871 when Congress codified the understanding,212 is 
that a state shall be liable for violation of the Constitution and laws.
The other mystery now is why impunity for government viola-
tions of the Constitution should ever have been assumed to be a 
conservative position. When government, state or federal, is the 
problem instead of the solution, a true conservatism would surely 
ensure responsibility, not impunity.
C. On State Immunity
Having made our attempt to find a basis for state sovereignty in 
the Constitution, we can proceed to examine the Court’s position 
on state immunity.
1. The Court’s Position and the Real Position
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Franchise III seems written with con-
fidence that the states should be able to violate law with impunity. 
He himself may believe that there is a pressing need for this im-
munity, so pressing that the states must be afforded a constitution-
ally required defense of federal immunity, even in state-law cases 
and even in state-law cases in state courts.
Yet the states are able to act only through their personnel. They 
routinely come forward and defend in suits against their person-
nel. The states settle ordinary tort claims against their workers and 
constitutional tort claims against their officials, or they appear, de-
fend, and pay any judgments against them. They budget for these 
obligations.
To be sure, in courts of general jurisdiction, a state is almost al-
ways immune as a party of record. There is a party-of-record rule of 
212. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22 §1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1983)).
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ancient lineage, prominent in the early case of Osborn v. Bank,213 a
rule which precludes suits against a state as defendant of record. 
But suit against state officers and agencies has long been permit-
ted.214 The familiar mechanism, at law as in equity, is that of the 
Anglo-American “officer suit.” The action is brought against the re-
sponsible official or department, but not formally against the state. 
Nevertheless, the state settles or defends it and pays any judgment. 
Alternatively, the state simply indemnifies its employee, should she 
be held liable.
For this purpose, the states maintain civil litigation departments 
and employ trial lawyers. Most states have “little” tort claims acts. 
Some have “little” civil rights acts as well. In the absence of such 
legislation, a state will indemnify an official who has been held lia-
ble, just as a city will, sometimes insuring against the event. If the 
state does not come in and defend, the insurer will. We will be ex-
ploring this real-world experience in a later Part.215
2. State Immunity and the Constitution
State immunity has no more presence in the Constitution’s text 
than state sovereignty does. There are “immunities” in Article IV 
and in the Fourteenth Amendment, but those are the (privileges 
and) immunities of citizens, not of states.
The sovereign immunity the states can claim today has its origins 
wholly in the Supreme Court’s own untethered jurisprudence. The 
Court has extended the Eleventh Amendment and its supposed 
background postulates beyond all recognition in an unending line 
of startling cases,216 and without regard to the Eleventh Amend-
ment’s text.
It is common knowledge that the Eleventh Amendment was a 
reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia,217 an ordinary contract case brought 
in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over diversity cases 
against a state. It was a case seeking to make Georgia pay a debt to 
213. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 739, 797 (1824).
214. Cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (holding that although a federal agency’s
sovereign immunity had been waived, the needed Bivens action would not lie).
215. See infra Part VI.
216. For recent extensions of the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereignty, see supra
note 30; and infra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. For earlier extensions see LOUISE 
WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL 
POWER 779–846 (1994).
217. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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a foreigner. As the first Justice Harlan would point out,218 Chisholm
was probably right when decided. Among other things, the Found-
ers wanted our credit, public and private, to appear sound to the 
world.219 But after Chisholm, there was a backlash, and the Eleventh 
Amendment was the result. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment simply 
overrides Chisholm on its facts. It is, read literally, only a rule of 
construction for Article III, limiting federal judicial power over a 
variety of diversity cases against a state. The Amendment provides 
that the judicial power shall not be “construed” to apply in diversity 
cases like Chisholm, cases enforcing a common-law commercial con-
tract against a state.
An all-purpose federal immunity defense for the states neverthe-
less has long been attributed to the Eleventh Amendment. And 
now the defense is attributed vaguely to “the Constitution,” more 
vaguely to federalism, and even more vaguely to the “Constitution’s
structure,” which is federalism plus a mysterious stripping of pow-
ers of diplomacy and negotiation.
A potent support for state immunity has also been found in the 
supposition of vague background “postulates.” These are the mys-
terious background understandings that the Lochner-era Court in
its last discreditable years could discern back in 1934—background 
“postulates that limit and control.”220 We now have arrived at the 
background “postulate” of an all-encompassing inviolable federal-
ized state immunity in state courts, whether the states want it or 
not.221
Think about this. Here, in 2020, is a textualist Supreme Court 
insisting that a little postulate that is not there222 is one of the most 
vital parts of the constitutional order. Yet nothing in American his-
tory or Anglo-American tradition commends lawless governance 
unchecked by courts when a private person is injured thereby and 
complains.
Reading blanket state sovereign immunity into a Constitution 
that is silent on the subject and, with its Fourteenth Amendment 
218. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I am of opinion 
that the decision in [Chisholm] was based upon a sound interpretation of the constitution as 
that instrument then was.”).
219. See George Washington, Circular to the States (June 14, 1783), in FRIENDS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS 1787–1788, 12–22 (Colleen A. 
Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998).
220. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
221. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 719 (1999) (taking the position that it is a back-
ground understanding of the Constitution that, notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause, 
federal law cannot be enforced against a state in its own courts without its consent).
222. Hughes Mearns, Antigonish, reprinted in BEST REMEMBERED POEMS 107 (Martin 
Gardner ed., 1992) (“Yesterday upon the stair/ I met a man who wasn’t there. / He wasn’t 
there again today. / I wish, I wish he’d go away.”).
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reads the other way, has been the Supreme Court’s project for far 
too long. The Supreme Court has shielded the states from the na-
tional ideals of independent accessible courts and fair government, 
as though a state is too autonomous and dignified, or perhaps too 
broke,223 to respond to tort claims. It is an all-encompassing juris-
prudential régime of lawlessness, now fully applicable in both sets 
of courts, in both federal and state cases.
3. State Immunity and Federal Common Law
This paper has been arguing federalized state sovereign immun-
ity is not to be found in the Constitution, or in the federalism em-
bedded in the Constitution’s “structure,” as Justice Thomas at-
tempted to argue in Franchise III. Rather, it is to be found only in 
Supreme Court opinions—over a century of them—including 
Franchise III. State sovereign immunity is simply a creature of feder-
al common law.
There is a certain irony in this. Federal common law has been 
the Court’s particular whipping-boy. Yet federal common law is 
simply the decision of federal cases, and the decision of federal 
cases is the business the Supreme Court is in. Moreover, the Con-
stitution, Article III, extends the federal judicial power to every 
federal case and every federal question. Nevertheless, the Court 
opines that making a federal cause of action cognizable, and even 
utilization of existing federal causes of action, somehow lie beyond 
its ordinary adjudicatory powers. In the Court’s view, only Congress 
can provide causes of action, even a cause of action for violation of 
the Constitution224 or of Congress’s own enactments.225 The latter 
disrespect for acts of Congress is what the Supreme Court terms 
“deference to Congress” and to the “separation of powers.”
223. We will turn to the question of the impact of state tort liability on state budgets in-
fra Part V.
224. See supra note 125 on the refusal of the Supreme Court in such cases as Hernandez 
v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020), to approve a Bivens claim. See also, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 545 
U.S. 537 (2007) (Souter, J.) (holding that an action would not lie against federal agents for 
a decade of harassment destroying the plaintiff’s business). In Wilkie, Justice Ginsburg, dis-
senting, characterized the agency’s decade of outrageous attacks on Robbins’ ranch as 
“death by a thousand cuts.” Id. at 555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, however, 
writing for the Court, characterized it as “hard bargaining.” Id. at 554. Perhaps Justice Sout-
er, if on the Court today, would characterize the Tax Board’s outrageous misconduct in 
Franchise III as “zealous auditing.”
225. See RJR-Nabisco v. European Union, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (Alito, J.) (holding that 
Congress failed to make plain the extraterritorial reach of federal anti-terror jurisdiction in 
part of an act of Congress that the Court itself read as instinct with extraterritorial inten-
tion).
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On the other hand, the Court freely creates and insists upon 
federal common-law defenses, such as state sovereign immunity. In 
cases such as Alden v. Maine, we find the Court’s textualist majority 
insisting that “federalism” somehow implies an atextual permission 
to the states to violate the Constitution and laws and to ignore the 
Supremacy Clause and the oath of office. In Franchise III, we find a 
federal common-law rule that a state be allowed to come into an-
other state to violate the tort law of both states, even if suit is 
brought at the place of injury, where the plaintiff resides.
Original sin in this area lies in Hans v. Louisiana,226 the case that 
first extended the Eleventh Amendment seriously beyond its ex-
press terms. We have seen that, to avoid one “anomaly,” the Hans
Court created another.227 After Hans, immunity rules would apply 
in federal courts different from those applied in state courts. Alden
and Franchise III share one virtue: they put paid to that further 
anomaly. The bad news is that in sustaining the states’ immunity 
from suit in both judicial systems, Alden and Franchise III trash the 
ability of either judicial system to enforce law, any law, state or fed-
eral, enacted or customary, against any state. It is a régime of un-
controlled state government lawlessness.
Sometimes state immunity is framed as a rule that suit against a 
state can be maintained only if the state consents. Yet we sense, if 
only from the licensed wage theft in Alden v. Maine, that there is an 
unreality in conditioning suits against a state on the state’s consent. 
How can a state decide for itself whether it is free to violate an act 
of Congress? Or the Constitution? Nevertheless this “consent” for-
mula persists, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
in terms emphatically does not condition on state consent the du-
ties it magisterially imposes upon them.228
This concocted “consent” requirement does not earn points for 
any benefit it bestows. There should be no free pass for a state of-
ficer or worker to oppress any segment of its population or any 
person within or beyond the state. After all, We, the People, or-
dained and established the Constitution “in Order,” we said, “to 
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general 
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
226. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
227. See supra notes 29, 158 and accompanying text.
228. This “consent” fiction is traced most familiarly to Alexander Hamilton’s argument 
in The Federalist No. 81, attempting to defend the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton was referring, as he had made 
clear in The Federalist No. 32, to ordinary contract cases—that is, to cases that would typically 
be governed by state law today. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Posterity.”229 We did not ordain and establish the Constitution to 
give the states permission to violate it.
The saving message for us in all this is that the Court’s long bat-
tle for state official impunity is just federal common law. It can be 
overruled.
IV. ON THE PLACE OF TRIAL
It is singular, and worthy of note, that the Supreme Court, in 
Franchise III, held unconstitutional a taking of jurisdiction to adju-
dicate a tort occurring at the place of trial. Ironically, the Court 
has recently been holding in international cases that courts in this 
country may not adjudicate a common-law tort attributable to for-
eign government officials in the absence of injury here.230 In another 
recent international case, involving an action authorized by an act 
of Congress without territorial limit, the Supreme Court held that 
to justify trial here, the United States must be the place of injury.231
Clearly, all else equal, the place of injury is the one place that sure-
ly does have power to exercise “a jurisdiction given.”232 Or so one 
would have thought, until Franchise III.
To the Franchise III Court, it made a difference that the defend-
ant was a state. And indeed, the defendant state, California, was ar-
guing, in effect, that it was immune in Nevada. But California 
would not have been immune at home. California had waived its 
immunity under its tort claims act. Notwithstanding the over-
whelming support of the states in Franchise III for jettisoning Fran-
chise I and overruling Nevada v. Hall, the jurisdiction the states 
threw away in Franchise III could hardly matter to them, if immunity 
is the issue. It is hard to see why a state needs to be more immune 
in interstate cases than it is in intrastate cases.
It also should have weighed more strongly with the Supreme 
Court in Franchise III that courts at the place of injury have adjudi-
catory and lawmaking power over that injury as a matter of course. 
The place of injury has legitimate governmental interests in com-
pensation and deterrence. In addition, the place of injury is often 
the place where the plaintiff resides. In both Franchise III and in 
Nevada v. Hall, the plaintiffs were in their home states when offi-
cials from another state intruded themselves into the plaintiffs’
229. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
230. See, e.g., Personenverkehr v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 396 (2015).
231. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
232. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (“We 
have no more right to decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp 
that which is not given.”).
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home state and caused injury there. Government tort policies are 
not extinguished by the fact that the tortfeasor is a nonresident. 
State long-arm statutes exist to vindicate the state’s own interests 
when the tortfeasor is a nonresident. In a just world, the further 
fortuity that the tortfeasor is a government employee would aug-
ment rather than diminish the rights of plaintiffs.
The irony of the Court’s positions to the contrary in our two 
cases is underscored in cases in which the tort is also a crime. Re-
cently the Supreme Court has offered a vigorous argument that 
when a tort is also a crime, prosecution is preferable to civil suit.233
But if a state employee flees the place of her crime and is indicted 
at home (the suggested preferred venue in light of Franchise III), 
the place of the crime is very likely to demand rendition, and, un-
der Article IV of the Constitution, the employee’s home state 
would have to render him up to the place of the crime.234 Yet, in 
cases like Franchise III, the place of the tort cannot take jurisdiction. 
This anomaly is just another example of the incoherence of the 
Court’s recent thinking about the place of trial in cases of cross-
border tort.
V. THE COSTS OF LIABILITY
We know that there are very few cases of interstate government 
tort. But in thinking about the rare such case, it is helpful to re-
member that a large part of the costs of defending would be ex-
pended by the tortfeasor’s home state even if the case were litigat-
ed there. And it would be litigated there if the law there were more 
favorable to the plaintiff. In short, if the state defendant is ad-
judged to be responsible, it is not unlikely that he would be so 
found by a jury at home as well as away. And damages, as sought by 
plaintiff’s counsel, would tend to be similar in either state. To be 
sure, in interstate litigation there would have been the expensive 
nuisance of hiring local counsel, if desired, and of having home 
counsel travel to the neighboring state for hearings, if counsel so 
chooses. But such inconveniences are borne every day by private 
nonresident defendants in tort cases. For a state government these 
are not heavy costs.
It makes some economic difference, of course, just where litiga-
tion resources are expended. If money is to be spent, any state 
would rather have it spent at home. But, again, consider how easily 
233. For the Court’s recent statement of this preference, see RJR-Nabisco v. European Un-
ion, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (Alito, J.).
234. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2, cl. 2.
56 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:1
these costs can be borne. In the Franchise Tax Board litigation itself, 
California cheerfully paid its auditors’ expenses as they encroached 
on Mr. Hyatt’s peace and privacy. With equal equanimity Califor-
nia absorbed its lawyers’ expenses as they defended with notable 
persistency against Hyatt’s claims.
While I am saying all this, the reader has been thinking, “What 
about the fiscal crisis in some of the states. Don’t the states need
immunity? No matter where they are sued?” Especially in the wake 
of the economic damage sustained in the current pandemic, how 
can any of the states pay for the torts of their workers and employ-
ees, much less meet their pension and other obligations? Indeed, 
how can a state afford to hire back the part of its workforce that it 
has had to let go, much less defend suits against them?
Notwithstanding these important concerns, the states will con-
tinue, I believe, to answer to claims alleging injuries at the hands of 
their officers. In part, they will do so because liability is not as 
heavy a budget item as is supposed, and in part, for the same rea-
son they continue to answer to contract claims and to pay bills as 
they come due.
A little thought will reveal why the states enact tort claims acts—
or, by indemnifying employees who are found liable, act as if they 
have done so. Most pertinent to this inquiry is the actuality that, 
whatever immunities with which they are formally cloaked, most 
American states choose to settle claims for injuries caused by their 
employees. To the extent they have understood the wisdom of do-
ing so, it cannot matter much just where they are sued. But let us 
pause to consider more closely the reasons state governments con-
tinue to answer to tort claims.
VI. THE COSTS OF IMMUNITY:
WHY STATES PROVIDE FOR PUBLIC-LAW LITIGATION
It becomes a matter of some interest to weigh the costs of liabil-
ity against the costs of immunity. A state legislature might consider 
it advantageous to provide that the costs of a government tort be 
allowed to fall on the state worker occasioning it or, what amounts 
to the same thing, on the injured party, even in a wholly domestic 
case. But the broad consensus of opinion about best tort policy 
long ago reached contrary conclusions. It is widely assumed to be a 
superior allocation of the costs of injury to spread them broadly. 
Allowing disasters needlessly to affect the lives of individuals has 
never made sense and is injurious to society. At the extreme, the 
uncompensated tort plaintiff and unindemnified government 
worker, both will find it hard to return to productive work, and 
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their plight will make the lives of others less comfortable and less 
safe. And in a global pandemic the dysfunction associated with 
unmanaged liabilities is likely to be greatly magnified.
The point of public-law litigation against state officers is not to 
win cases but to protect state employees, while not allowing the 
costs of government tort to fall on the injured. But refusal to meet 
a state’s tort liabilities will generate heavy consequential costs.
“Advantages” obtained by allowing the risks of employee tort to 
lie where they fall will incur their own costs. A state thinking to 
protect its fisc by declining to protect its workers from the costs of 
litigation and the burden of judgments may find itself struggling to 
recruit a workforce. A state unwilling to provide reasonable redress 
for injuries caused by its officers can appear lawless and unsafe. A 
state government that cares more for its immunities than for its re-
sponsibilities can present to visitors and investors a sorry picture of 
dysfunction.
One can see more clearly why states tend to take responsibility 
for their workers’ torts when one considers the analogy of the fed-
eral Tucker Act.235 By the Tucker Act, the nation guarantees its own 
contracts and waives its own sovereign immunity to contract claims, 
immunizing the responsible official for the breach, while relying 
on internal disciplinary measures for deterrence.236 The nation 
provides the Court of Claims for most commercial claims against it. 
The nation does all this for the same reason it pays its bills as they 
come due. It is no more in the national interest than in a state’s in-
terest to stiff its suppliers or to steal the wages of its workers.237 A
nation seeking to protect its fisc in such ways may soon find itself 
unable to equip its armies. A state that does not pay its creditors 
will soon be unable to buy office supplies.
It might be supposed, these days, with some states under water 
for insufficiently funded pension liabilities, and their economies 
impacted by the coronavirus pandemic, that concern for a state’s
fisc does justify the Supreme Court’s solicitude. However, the costs 
of maintaining a civil litigation division in a legal department, to-
gether with all the liabilities the state assumes, amount to a small 
part of a state budget.238 California’s annual state budget for 2019–
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1449.
236. Concededly, such measures have not been very effective. See Editorial, The Root of 
Impunity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2020, at 8.
237. But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that a state cannot be sued in 
its own courts for failing to pay the overtime wage required by an act of Congress, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207k); §203 C.F.R. §216(b) (providing an express right of 
action for violation of the Act, with concurrent jurisdiction in both sets of courts).
238. See The 2019-20 Budget: California Spending Plan, LAO (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4097 [https://perma.cc/B4GQ-Q32Z].
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2020 was the highest in the United States at $214 billion.239 Like 
other state budgets, it is focused on health and education.240 Cali-
fornia’s civil litigation department and the liabilities settled or paid 
by it, even under California’s liberal statutory arrangements for 
public-law litigation, amount at most to some small fraction of the 
state’s budgetary allocation to its Justice Department, and that 
comprehensive budget is nowhere near the magnitude of the 
state’s budget for education or health.241 In short, the costs of civil 
litigation against California are vanishingly small as compared with 
California’s total budget.
True, a rich state like California can more easily absorb costs 
than a less monied state. But the same analysis turns out to apply in 
states with very modest budgets, like Nevada. When rules of sover-
eign immunity—or unrealistic limits on recovery, like Nevada’s—
succeed in balking justice in cases of civil wrong, they save govern-
ment from liabilities and inconveniences that are too minor to 
blame for threats to state workers’ pensions or the state fisc gener-
ally.242
For orderly, sensible management of tort liabilities, the states, 
just as the cities and counties do, and just as the nation does,243 al-
239. See 2019-20 State Budget: Enacted Budget Detail, CALIF. DEP’T OF FINANCE (June 
27, 2019), http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/budget/publication/#/e/2019-20/BudgetDetail 
[https://perma.cc/T3H3-QNNT].
240. See id. See generally List of U.S. State Budgets, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/List_of_U.S._state_budgets [https://perma.cc/NFG7-EBGS] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020) 
(showing California’s budget for 2017 to have been $214.8 billion and the next highest 
budget, New York’s, at $177 billion).
241. See California’s 2019-20 State Budget: Enacted Budget Detail, supra note 239.
242. It must be acknowledged that such estimates could be affected in unpredictable 
ways by the pandemic.
243. With respect to suit against the federal government, see, for example, Sarah Mac-
araig, Border Patrol Violence: U.S. Paid Millions to Settle Claims Against the Agency, THE GUARDIAN
(May 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/01/border-patrol-violence-
us-paid-60m-to-cover-claims-against-the-agency [https://perma.cc/Q4TA-VF4D]. With re-
spect to the states, see Iris Lewis, State Settles with 5-hour Energy in False Advertising Lawsuit, VT.
DIGGER (Aug. 14, 2019), https://vtdigger.org/2019/08/14/state-settles-with-5-hour-energy-
in-false-advertising-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/GNS3-C9JF]; Michelle Theriault Boots, State 
Settles Suit by Inmate who Suffered Paralysis at Spring Creek Prison for $1.8 Million, ANCHORAGE 
DAILY NEWS (June 19, 2019), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/2019/06/20/state-settles-
lawsuit-brought-by-inmate-who-suffered-paralysis-at-spring-creek-prison-for-18-million/
[https://perma.cc/Q7TB-LZSP]; Vickie Aldous, State Will Pay Family After Deadly Drunk Driv-
ing Crash, OR. MAIL TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2019), https://mailtribune.com/news/top-stories
/oregon-lawsuit-drunk-driving-crash-duii-fatal-karen-greenstein-jackson-county-wrong-way-
driver [https://perma.cc/3DAG-N2KX]; and Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Michigan State Settles Nassar 
Lawsuits for $500 Million, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 17, 2018), https:
//www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/05/17/michigan-state-settles-nassar-survivors-half-
billion-dollar-payout [https://perma.cc/83YT-WE3J] (regarding gymnasts abused by a Uni-
versity doctor). With respect to cities, see, for example, Adert Hassan, Minneapolis to Pay $20 
Million to Family of Victim Shot by Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2019, at A10.
FALL 2020] Sovereign Immunity and Interstate Government Tort 59
ready maintain civil trial divisions in their legal departments.244 The 
states, just as the cities and counties do and the nation does, de-
fend actions against their officers and employees.
The costs of maintaining civil litigation departments staffed with 
trial lawyers are sunk and continuing costs that are relatively inelas-
tic to the heaviness or lightness of litigation in a particular year. 
These costs are estimated and budgeted for, just as are the costs of 
maintaining courts and judges, along with the costs of defending 
lawsuits, as well as of settlements and adverse money judgments. 
These costs, however heavy, are very small items in a state’s overall 
budget. State budgets are measured not in millions, but in billions, 
largely devoted to education, health, and pensions.245
Consider, for example, the recent case of Sandra Bland in Tex-
as.246 Ms. Bland had been stopped by a state trooper for failing to 
signal a lane change. The trooper ordered her out of her car for 
insubordination and then had her jailed for resisting arrest. The 
young black woman had been on her way to a new job and a new 
life as a teacher. She was found hanged in her cell overnight while 
in state custody. Texas officials claimed it was suicide. One suspects 
that Ms. Bland was strung up in her cell for making inconvenient 
noise, but the family was unable to prove wrongful death and 
lodged an alternative claim for excessive force by the arresting of-
ficer. Texas has a typical tort claims act.247 Texas settled the case, 
reportedly for $1.9 million,248 a fraction of what it might have had 
to pay had the family been able to prove wrongful death. Similarly, 
had Ms. Bland’s car been struck accidentally by the trooper’s car, 
an action for negligence would have been available against the of-
ficer. Texas would have defended the officer or indemnified him, 
up to the amount of its current dollar indemnification cap.249
244. See generally MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., State Sovereign Immunity and Tort 
Liability in All 50 States, https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/STATE-
SOVEREIGN-IMMUNITY-AND-TORT-LIABILITY-CHART.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT97-
M64D] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020) (describing the liability of each of the fifty states). The 
chart in MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra, does not include information about 
unenacted remedial policies and practices.
245. See Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (July 25, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/policy-
basics-where-do-our-state-tax-dollars-go [https://perma.cc/VXC5-4B8N].
246. See David Montgomery, The Death of Sandra Bland: Is There Anything Left To 
Investigate?, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/us
/sandra-bland-texas-death.html [https://perma.cc/6UPU-E6D4].
247. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001–109 (West 2018).
248. See Mary Huber, Advocates Remember Sandra Bland’s Legacy on Day Named in Her Honor,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 13, 2019, at B-1, B-7.
249. See Fernando C. Gomez, A Primer on State Employee Liability, SAM HOUSTON STATE 
UNIV. (2011), https://www.shsu.edu/dotAsset/0b97f3e1-3d25-496d-9569-27a1cda534d4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5RX-7ARW].
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With the Supreme Court’s blithe goodbye to both Nevada v. Hall
and Franchise Tax Board, state governments now have a shiny new 
federal immunity in interstate cases. Apparently, they can add this 
meretricious federal defense to their armamentarium in intrastate 
and interstate cases alike, and in state and federal courts alike. All 
this federalized immunity may seem gratifying, like a cheap but 
glittering toy under the Christmas tree, to the immediate percep-
tion of the states’ trial team. Yet, like the cheap toy to the hopeful 
child, none of this is what the states really want and need—the in-
telligent management of government tort.
VII. A POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY FOR TWENTY-NINE STATES
The traditional workaround that defeats government immunity 
has always been the officer suit. The plaintiff forgoes suit against 
the state and simply sues the individual government employee or 
official responsible for her injuries. The party-of-record rule sug-
gests as much. In the long tradition of the common law, a govern-
ment is not sued as party of record. The rule may reflect the irra-
tional character of naming a non-person as if it were an individual. 
The workaround permits suit against the individual alleged to have 
been at fault.
In the wake of Franchise III, however, a new difficulty may have 
arisen for state management of government workers’ torts. This is 
a difficulty affecting the states that have had the wisdom to enact 
tort claims acts. It is a particular concern for those among them 
that have permitted their tort claims acts to apply to intentional as 
well as unintentional torts, thus tending to bring the intentional 
government tort within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Civil Rights Act.250
The difficulty is that, after Franchise III, the mechanism of a tort 
claims act could defeat rather than facilitate the traditional officer-
suit workaround for damages cases. Recall that, in the interest of 
protecting both the state worker and her tort victim, a state tort 
claims act works by waiving the immunity of the state but immuniz-
ing the state worker. This might become an issue in the states that 
have tort claims acts, when a plaintiff seeks to sue the very officer 
who injured her. Most judges, I think, would not be comfortable 
allowing a tort victim to sue an immunized worker, even though 
the worker’s employer, the state, is also immunized.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871).
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After Franchise III, “the Constitution” requires that the state be
immune. Under the same state’s tort claims act, the state officer is 
also immune. Where does that leave the plaintiff?
Consider the following scenario. Because a main purpose of the 
state tort claims act is to protect the plaintiff, a state court might 
permit an officer suit against the immunized employee to proceed, 
judicially nullifying the state’s tort claims act. The state would be 
very likely to come into court to defend its employee. The state 
cannot rely on the very statute the state judge has nullified. The 
state might try to argue that its appearance in court constitutes a 
waiver of immunity. But that would be the sort of “constructive”
waiver that has been disapproved by the Court; the Court requires 
explicit waiver of federalized state immunity, unlike state-law im-
munity, in the clear language in a statute.251 The waiver of state 
immunity, so helpful in suits under tort claims acts before Franchise 
III, now could be useless.
The problem may even be bigger than we have thus far imag-
ined. Waiver may be off the table even in wholly domestic cases. Some 
of Justice Thomas’s language in Franchise III can be read to cover 
that ground. And the problem is not simply one of language. The 
fact is, Franchise III cloaked the states with a federal immunity that 
is deeply embedded in the federalism that is deeply embedded in the 
“structure” of the Constitution. This constitutionally-required im-
munity cannot rationally be confined to interstate cases, any more 
than the Constitution itself can be so confined. Will it ever be pos-
sible for a state to waive a constitutional requirement that is deeply 
embedded in our “constitutional structure”?252
The problem is not merely the technical problem that the Su-
preme Court requires explicit waivers of identified federal immun-
ities, as well as explicit waivers of state immunity (recall that there 
is a clear statement rule).253 It is not merely that a typically short-
sighted state legislature might, against the state’s own actual inter-
ests, explicitly state that its waiver of state immunity is not a waiver 
of its federal immunity.254 Consider a domestic case in which the 
251. Id. (imposing a clear statement rule now applied both to waivers of immunity by a 
state as well as to abrogations of immunity by Congress, and disapproving the doctrine of 
“constructive waiver” of Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
252. In interstate cases in the configuration seen in Franchise III, the problem of finding 
power to waive immunity may be even more perplexing than in domestic cases since the 
holding in Franchise III is not dictum with respect to interstate cases.
253. See, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2010) (holding that a state does not waive 
its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds, and that waiver of state immunity does 
not waive federal immunity); Atascadero v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (creating a clear 
statement rule now applied to both waiver of immunity by a state or abrogation of immunity 
by Congress).
254. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-23(b) (2019).
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state has waived its federal immunity in the clear language of a 
state statute, and cheerfully submits to jurisdiction. An appellate 
court could well rule sua sponte that federal sovereign immunity is 
jurisdictional. Once taking on that color, federal immunity will al-
most certainly not be waivable. Jurisdiction is not waivable. Thus, 
even explicit state legislative waivers of federalized immunity for 
the states may well be beyond a state’s power of waiver. And, a forti-
ori, waiver could not then reclaim the advantages, in a particular 
case, of adjudicatory power over government tort—intrastate as 
well as interstate.
It might be supposed that Congress could step in and relieve the 
states of this new helplessness. But there is a further difficulty. The 
Supreme Court, with bold improvidence, has stripped Congress of 
Article I power—any Article I power—to abrogate the immunities 
of the states. That was the holding of the Seminole Tribe case.255
(Even with the passage of time one still shakes one’s head in disbe-
lief.) The Court has had to back down in bankruptcy cases,256 but 
has drawn the line there. There can be no other exceptions.257
Nothing can explain or justify Seminole Tribe’s sledgehammer attack 
on the power of Congress and on federal supremacy.
Franchise III joins Seminole Tribe and Alden v. Maine as an extrem-
ist success in the Court’s inexplicable struggle to lavish almost an-
tebellum power on the states, putting it beyond the power of 
courts to impose the national will upon the states, and to diminish 
the powerful nationhood that the Framers left us and that the Civil 
War preserved and advanced.
VIII. WHAT, THEN, IS TO BE DONE?
Broad language in Franchise III, although dictum (and lawyers 
should argue that it is dictum), can be taken to have bestowed uni-
versal federalized sovereign immunity on the states in domestic as 
255. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 46 (1996).
256. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). Katz does not suggest clause-by-
clause reconsideration of Seminole Tribe; the Court has just held that the Katz exception to 
Seminole Tribe is strictly limited to bankruptcy. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002 (2020).
257. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002. Allen, a copyright case, seems compelled by Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), a patent 
case to the same effect. Justice Kagan, writing for the Allen Court, made this point. Allen, 140 
S. Ct. at 1002. What is particularly painful about such cases is that they strip Congress not 
simply of general Article I power, but of powers specifically granted in Article I—in this in-
stance, the so-called Copyright [and Patent] Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving 
Congress power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries”).
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well as interstate cases. It is not clear what the Court’s intentions 
are for the traditional workaround of an officer suit. Even though 
tort claims acts may stand to lose effectiveness, there would seem to 
be no reason why traditional officer suits would not work in inter-
state as well as domestic cases. This would require not only that the 
responsible state officer become the named defendant of record 
but also that she be pleaded in her “individual capacity,” rather 
than, or coupled with, an “official capacity” designation.
“Individual capacity” pleading is little more than a pleading de-
vice, but it has become a necessary and useful one. It is explicitly 
required in cases pleadable as violations of civil rights—required by 
the early case of Scheuer v. Rhodes,258 as explained in Hafer v. Melo.259
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Hafer Court, pointed out that in-
dividual-capacity pleading avoids the rule of Will v. Michigan,260
which held that a state is not a “person” within the meaning of the 
Civil Rights Act. It should also avoid the imputation that the 
named defendant officer is the state itself. An officer joined as de-
fendant in her official capacity is the “state.”
This is what may have gone wrong in cases like the recent copy-
right case, Allen v. Cooper,261 in which the defendant of record was 
the state governor. All state officials, including a governor, are 
“state actors,” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Civil Rights Act. But they are best sued in their individual 
capacity. Since a government tort can neither be committed nor 
remedied except by the government, the individual held responsi-
ble is responsible in her official rather than individual capacity. Be-
cause of this dual nature of a government defendant, lawyers have 
adopted the expedient of pleading against such a defendant both 
in her individual capacity and in her official capacity,262 and the de-
258. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
259. 502 U.S. 21, 29–30 (1991). It follows from Hafer that in cases pleaded in individual 
capacity, damages are awarded not against the state, but against the named defendant of-
ficer. However, for the reasons given here, the officer in such cases is almost always fully in-
demnified, and the state will furnish the legal defense as well. In this way the substantial 
equivalent of a tort claims act is achieved, notwithstanding the diligently maintained fiction 
that the state is immune.
260. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Will is no longer strictly necessary to the Supreme Court’s evi-
dent project of denying enforcement of constitutional rights against the states. A state can-
not be sued in either set of courts, as defendant of record, under the Eleventh Amendment 
and its background propositions. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending a new 
federal defense of sovereign immunity to state courts in federal-law cases); Franchise III, 139 
S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (extending Alden’s federal immunity defense to state-law cases in state 
courts). Lawyers may try to limit Franchise III to state-law violations pleadable as constitution-
al torts, but I doubt with much success.
261. 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). On Allen v. Cooper, see supra notes 4, 256–57 and accompany-
ing text.
262. Caveat: One would not append the phrase “acting in her official capacity” to the 
officer’s name in the caption but would confine that phrase to the allegations of the tort. 
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fendant rarely objects, for the same reason that it may have a tort 
claims act on the books. The government trial team takes over, or 
the government indemnifies in the absence of a tort claims act.
There is a familiar analogy to this problem of “individual capaci-
ty” versus “official capacity” in the Anglo-American officer suit in 
equity. The officer suit in equity was made fit for modern Ameri-
can use in the great case of Ex parte Young (1908).263 There, the Su-
preme Court, by Justice Peckham, held that a state’s attorney gen-
eral, defendant in an injunction case alleging a threatened or 
ongoing violation of the Constitution, is not the “state” for purpos-
es of Eleventh Amendment immunity but remains a “state actor”
for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment liability. Justice Peckham, 
in Young, declined to hold the Eleventh Amendment trumped by 
the after-enacted Fourteenth Amendment. He stated, impressively, 
that he intended to give each Amendment its full value.264 He then 
explained that the responsible official, for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is a state actor, and of course is a state actor in reality. 
But by his alleged infraction, for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment,
the officer is “stripped” of the state’s cloak of immunity.265
Peckham was no liberal. Undoubtedly he intended the power he 
carved out for the courts266 in Young to be deployed in enforcement 
of his opinion in Lochner and its new “liberty of contract,”267 pro-
The phrase “in his individual capacity” is used in a case’s caption, to identify the capacity in 
which the officer is sued.
263. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that neither the immunity of the Eleventh Amend-
ment nor the principle underlying the Anti-Injunction Act, today found at 28 U.S.C. §2283, 
bars a federal injunction against a state official to block a threatened or ongoing violation of 
federal law). Justice Peckham points out that the federal court was first seized of the ac-
tion—that no action was then pending in the state court.
When such indictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an alleged unconsti-
tutional statute, which is the subject-matter of inquiry in a suit already pending in 
a Federal court, the latter court, having first obtained jurisdiction over the sub-
ject-matter, has the right, in both civil and criminal cases, to hold and maintain 
such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, until its duty is fully per-
formed. But the Federal court cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the 
proceedings were already pending in a state court.
209 U.S. at 161–62 (citation omitted).
264. Id. at 150 (“We think that whatever the rights of complainants may be, they are 
largely founded upon [the Fourteenth] Amendment, but a decision of this case does not 
require an examination or decision of the question whether its adoption in any way altered 
or limited the effect of the earlier [Eleventh] Amendment. We may assume that each exists 
in full force . . . .”).
265. Id. at 160.
266. In General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), decided on the same day as Ex parte 
Young, the Court held, by Justice McKenna, that state courts were under like obligation to 
supply the federal injunctive remedy in federal-law cases in equity.
267. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (Peckham, J.). Alas, this “liberty of 
contract” was the imagined “liberty” of an unemployed person to “agree” to inadequate 
wages, long hours, and unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, free from state regulation.
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tected substantively by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. But the common law grows and evolves, and the 
power carved out in Young to diminish protections for workers is 
the power that eventually became the federal structural injunction 
that enforced Brown v. Board of Education.
The suit against a named official in actions at law, although very 
different, gains force from the reasoning that sustains Ex parte 
Young actions in equity. Young’s immunity-stripping rationale sheds 
some light on the Supreme Court’s insistence on individual-
capacity pleading in an officer suit seeking damages. The Supreme 
Court explicitly relied on the analogy between the officer suit in 
equity and the action at law against an officer in holding, in Hafer 
v. Melo (a federal civil rights action for damages), that a state offi-
cial is sued in her “individual capacity” for purposes of the Eleventh 
Amendment but is charged with violating federal law in her “offi-
cial capacity”268 for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.269 The 
official, although “stripped” of her government employer’s cloak of 
immunity, nevertheless is very much a government official—a state 
actor—when she stands accused of constitutional tort.
Nor do these contrasting statements together comprise a mere 
legal fiction, as is commonly supposed. Both statements can be 
read simply as true. Any logician will tell you that the answer to a 
question depends on the purpose for which it is asked.
In a sense, an Ex parte Young action is always necessarily one in 
“official capacity,” yet it is equally true that equity can act only in 
personam. Again, both features of Young are instructive and correct. 
The defendant in a Young action must be the very official who can 
remedy the threatened tort by obeying the court’s injunction. Of 
course he can do so only in his official capacity. On the other 
hand, if he fails to obey the injunction, it is his person, not his of-
fice, that is threatened with contempt and ultimately a period of 
detention or other penalty. It will be recalled that Ex parte Young 
itself was handed down while the attorney general of Minnesota 
was confined in federal custody for contempt of a federal injunc-
tion. As Justice Harlan put this, vigorously dissenting, federal au-
thorities had laid “violent hands” on the state’s attorney general.270
I state all this partly to raise the question whether relief from 
Franchise III might be available in equity. That is, can a court sitting 
268. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
269. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237–38 (1974).
270. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There was no reason why 
[the trial court] should have laid violent hands upon the attorney general of Minnesota, and 
by its orders have deprived the state of the services of its constitutional law officer in its own 
courts.”). Indeed, Attorney General Young was before the Supreme Court both on a grant of 
appellate review and by a prayer for a writ of habeas corpus—that, is, for release.
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in equity order the payment of damages? The short answer is, 
“No.”271 There are monetary equitable remedies—restitution and 
disgorgement come to mind—that might suggest the availability of 
monetary relief in equity. But it is a general requirement of injunc-
tive relief that there be no adequate legal remedy. In cases against 
a state officer, a court cannot require a payment of money that 
could otherwise be an item of damages. The legal remedy, the ac-
tion at law for damages, would be “adequate,” and the action for 
injunction would be dismissed.
The plaintiff seeking monetary relief would probably do better 
in an action at law for damages than an action in equity for an in-
junction. An action at law might lie if seeking damages from a 
named state officer in her individual capacity for unjust failure to 
provide support for which the plaintiff is fully eligible. This action 
can include claims for consequential damages beyond the pay-
ments themselves—harms to health, loss of a home, or other seri-
ous consequences—losses for which an injunction to make the 
payments due will not compensate.
In a case of intentional government tort, like Franchise Tax 
Board, a case which might be pleadable as a constitutional tort, 
there is some power in Congress to abrogate state immunity under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.272 This power should 
have enabled Congress to abrogate a state’s immunity in constitu-
tional cases. But the Supreme Court has curtailed the Section 5 
power. The Section 5 power must be exercised in a manner that is 
“proportionate” to and has “congruence” with a perceived substan-
tial pattern of known violations.273 Even if our present gridlocked 
Congress were capable of enacting an explicit abrogation of state 
immunity in cases of interstate constitutional tort, the Supreme 
Court would strike down the effort as disproportionate for such a 
small number of cases. That was the problem in the case that itself 
invented the tests of proportionality and congruence. Religious 
freedom was argued to be at stake in the Boerne case,274 but the 
271. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 US 651 (1974). Edelman’s proscription, under the Elev-
enth Amendment, of an injunction for arrearages with respect to a federal statutory benefit is 
now somewhat tempered by a case on similar facts, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), 
which recognized a limited power of Congress in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
272. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
273. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a congruence 
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted 
to that end.”). This late-blooming requirement of proportionality and congruence put the 
kibosh on intellectual property cases against a state. Until Boerne, those cases were relying on 
the Section 5 power of Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, although it would 
appear that misappropriation of intellectual property by state universities is substantial, par-
ticularly under “work for hire” and similar rationales.
274. Id.
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Boerne Court, in striking down the sweeping Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act in its application to the states, read the language of 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment under this new federal 
stricture of proportionality and congruence, seeing no such pat-
tern of violations as would justify the legislation.275 Boerne was cor-
rectly decided, but the Court has used these vague standards to at-
tack the power of Congress even in matters of national commercial 
concern, like the regulation of labor, and even in the field of civil 
rights.276
There may still be room for solutions in some cases of interstate 
government tort. Courts at the place of injury, wishing to secure 
needed remediation for their own residents, might have leeway to 
carve out exceptions to, or distinctions from, Franchise III. Excep-
tions might be found, for example, for cases in which the defend-
ant nonresident official has deliberately inflicted physical injuries, 
or for cases pleaded as constitutional torts rather than as state-law 
torts.
In the end, however, we have to consider, notwithstanding the 
unlikelihood of success, the possibility of a frontal challenge to the 
régime of state sovereign immunity, from Hans v. Louisiana on 
down, including late-blooming federalized immunity. Peace to Jus-
tice Holmes, but the common law surely has the capacity to move 
by molar as well as molecular motions.277 The day may come, a 
generation or two hence, when the Supreme Court, and the states 
that unthinkingly sought a diminution in their own powers, will 
come to see Franchise III for what it was—a mistaken accommoda-
tion to short-sighted impulses.
275. Id. at 530.
276. See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012) (striking down the 
Family Medical Leave act’s self-care provision as applied to the states as employers, and 
holding that Congress had no power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the state em-
ployers in such cases, citing Seminole Tribe and Boerne); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress had no power to abrogate the sovereign im-
munity of the states as employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act, citing Seminole 
Tribe and Boerne).
277. See S. Pac. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I recognize 
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; 
they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”). Although there is truth in Justice 
Holmes’ observation, there are moments in legal history (Jensen is one of them) when the 
common law has not confined itself to incremental advances. Think, for example, of the 
judicial creation of product liability in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 
1916), which ruled that, if manufacturing negligence is reasonably certain to cause peril, 
knowing that others may use the product, the manufacturer is obligated to make the prod-
uct carefully. In Jensen, the Supreme Court identified the common law applied in admiralty 
cases as that of the federal sovereign, implied national lawmaking power in Congress from 
Article III’s grant of jurisdiction, and implied judicial lawmaking power from the implied 
power of Congress. 244 U.S. at 215–16. The Jensen Court held federal case law, sparse as it 
then was, supreme over a state statute, the New York workers’ compensation law, ruling that 
federal admiralty law completely preempted the field. Id. at 218.
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Challenges to the immunities of a state might not be without 
appeal to our textualist courts. As we have been reminded here, 
there is no language in the Eleventh Amendment or anywhere else 
in the Constitution requiring the blanket federalized immunity 
with which the states are now burdened. One need only re-read the 
Eleventh Amendment to see that it is irrelevant to the questions 
posed in modern immunity cases. State sovereign immunity is one 
of the many doctrines the Supreme Court has invented that turn 
out to have little use beyond stripping the nation and the states of 
needed adjudicatory powers.
Many of the Supreme Court’s non-enforcement doctrines, alt-
hough existing in large bodies of jurisprudence, are, after all, only 
federal case law. Since state sovereign immunity is a creature of 
case law, it can be overruled, just as Nevada v. Hall was overruled. 
Constitutional amendment should not be necessary.
In the long tradition of Anglo-American common law, “Freedom 
slowly broadens down / From precedent to precedent.”278 But that 
poetic insight views the judicial process in a top-down way, a way 
that is, in fact, unworkable and unreal. The “potted plant” theo-
ry,279 which holds that lower courts must woodenly apply Supreme 
Court precedents and Courts of Appeals precedents, is simply 
wrong. Obviously, the argument for change must be made early in 
a litigation to ensure that it is not waived.280
In the last analysis, it is up to us in the profession to free our-
selves from “potted plant” reliance on the existing legal order.281
There is nothing wrong with the bold argument for salutary 
change. Counsel can argue that Franchise III was wrongly decided, 
and trial and appellate courts can reassess Franchise III and, indeed, 
278. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, You Ask Me, Why, Tho’ Ill at Ease, reprinted in V THE 
ENGLISH POETS 116 (Thomas Humphry Ward ed., 1918) (poem, describing England as: “A
land of settled government, / A land of just and old renown, / Where Freedom broadens 
slowly down / From precedent to precedent”).
279. See Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 850–51 (1993) (criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s view that lower courts should woodenly follow existing but outmoded Supreme 
Court precedent until such time as the Supreme Court changes the law itself); see, e.g., Ro-
driguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“We do not sug-
gest that the Court of Appeals on its own authority should have taken the step of renounc-
ing Wilko. If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case yet appears to rest on 
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case 
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions.”).
280. Retired Justice Tom C. Clark once said: “In the final analysis, the nation’s law is 
made in the trial court.” Craig Alan Smith, Sitting by Designation: Retired Justice Tom C. Clark’s
Federal Court Service, 43 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 321, 322.
281. See Levinson, supra note 279.
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all the immunity cases.282 And after some decades of rejection, as 
the personnel on the Supreme Court shifts, the Court may come to 
see more clearly that, however vast the superstructure of state im-
munity the Court has labored to erect, state governments will con-
tinue to find it necessary and useful to work around that super-
structure. 
In the long run, it is possible that there will emerge a frank 
recognition in some future Supreme Court that public-law litiga-
tion, interstate as well as intrastate, federal as well as state, does go 
on, although requiring the pleading of archaic fictions. The Court 
may come to see that public-law litigation might as well take place 
upon more reasonable straightforward pleading. The complexities 
we have been examining should never have been imposed on cases 
of government tort.
New problems will no doubt generate new workarounds to over-
come them, and more defenses will arise to block those expedi-
ents. There is no good reason for any of this. The wisdom of com-
pensatory and deterrent tort policy has been understood and 
widely shared and is hardly controversial. In a straight-thinking 
world, the fiction of government immunity, the superstructure of 
fictitious workarounds and pleading devices required to suppress 
it, and the morass of rules surrounding waiver and abrogation—all 
would have been put behind us long ago and exchanged for un-
complicated access to justice, in both interstate and domestic cas-
es.283
While waiting for this to happen, the simplest way to achieve 
reasonable access now, consistent with widely shared tort law and 
policy, would be to substitute for the whole tottering edifice of sov-
ereign immunity at all levels of American government the common 
law’s functional equivalent of a good tort claims act—respondeat su-
perior. When ordinary private workers’ torts are administered, it is 
well understood that the ill-paid employee, or even the salaried ex-
ecutive, cannot pay damages for serious injuries that may have 
been caused by acts done within the scope of their employment. 
Thus, in private cases, no tort claims act is needed. The employer is 
pleaded in naturally, having spread the risk through insurance. 
The insurer comes in, defends, and pays any judgment.
282. On the problem of remediation of federal government tort, see Vicki C. Jackson, 
Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 521 (2003), which calls on the judiciary to move toward closing remedial gaps 
in suits against the United States. This is another fine addition to Professor Jackson’s portfo-
lio of work on sovereign immunity.
283. Accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L.
REV. 933, 933 (2019).
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The common wisdom grounding respondeat superior should be 
extended unambiguously to intentional torts. For government em-
ployees, this means coverage not only for their ordinary torts of 
negligence or recklessness but also their violations of civil rights 
legislation or of the Constitution.
A private college responds naturally, in every case, to tort claims 
against its professor or president or dean or mailroom clerk, for 
torts within the scope of their employment. The state university 
should similarly respond to tort claims against its employees. There 
is no defense of private employer immunity,284 and there should be 
none when the employer is the state. On the other hand, the im-
munity of every worker should be absolute, whether she is employed 
by government or a private company. She will be within the disci-
plinary measures of her department or agency or company. The 
measure of liability is actual damages, emotional as well as mone-
tary, tangible or intangible, economic or personal, past or future—
excepting only punitive damages.285 The state employer will have 
insurance, spreading the costs of liability broadly.
Prosecutors and judges already have absolute “official” immuni-
ty. So should every police officer and schoolteacher. It is a form of 
employee/worker immunity that should extend to everyone who 
works and in the course of doing so causes an injury. A govern-
ment, like a company or organization, cannot act except by its per-
sonnel. Litigation against government for the torts of government 
workers and officers should be as commonplace as litigation 
against employers for the torts of privately employed workers.
The use of respondeat superior in cases of government tort would 
require overrule of the principle of the Monell case, denying re-
spondeat superior in actions against a city,286 a rule now commonly 
applied at all levels of government. Tort claims acts should be ad-
284. The exception is in the case of injury to the worker herself, in which case workers’
compensation statutes usually remove the worker completely from the tort system. These 
statutes typically provide only a fraction of lost wages for a limited time and out-of-pocket 
medical expenses. There is no compensation for pain, or loss of limb or health, or grief 
therefor.
There is also considerable legislative interference with general tort law. Particularly un-
just may be the consequences of state legislation limiting tort recoveries to economic losses 
only. Future economic losses may be discounted as speculative. And economic losses may be 
insufficient to justify a lawyer’s taking the case.
285. For the general rule of sovereign non-liability for punitive damages, see supra notes 
78, 114 and accompanying text. Extending the rule against punitives to private employers 
would be protective of the employer and, indirectly, of other employees.
286. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that, in actions against 
a municipality, there can be no respondeat superior). A city is liable only for its own tort. This 
means that municipal liability is proved by a showing of city policy attributable to officials at 
a high level of authority.
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ministered with the understanding that they simply codify com-
mon-law respondeat superior.
Other writers are suggesting the expedient of respondeat superior,
moved by the same concern for widely shared tort policies ex-
pressed here.287 Arguing for respondeat superior in civil rights cases, 
Professor Fallon writes, “An ideal regime would substitute entity 
[for example, government or administrative agency] liability for 
officer liability and afford fairer opportunities for victims . . . .”288
Respondeat superior is a traditional concept comfortable to American 
judges and lawyers.
IX. CHANGING PLACES, SHIFTING POSITIONS
In our time a new “conservative” idea is attracting attention. 
Younger conservatives are talking about reining in the bureaucra-
cy, “taking back the administrative state,” and reducing the size of 
government.289 (The point of much of this, apparently, is to reduce 
the taxes that pay for social programs.) This revived conservative 
project requires putting paid to such doctrines as “Chevron defer-
ence”290—and other forms of deference to the political branches.
Deference to the political branches until very recently had been 
encouraged by conservatives who were angered by the perceived 
judicial activism of the Warren Court’s liberals back in the middle 
of the twentieth century. This anger has fed into modern doctrines 
of separation of powers, deference to the legislature, federalism, 
states’ rights, and a supposed impotence of the judiciary to fashion 
remedial law.
Liberals, for their part, with their old New Deal faith in govern-
ment, now seem increasingly to take the reactionary position that 
even bad government should be left unfettered.291 In other words, 
287. See Fallon, supra note 283 and accompanying text.
288. Id. at 933.
289. See Justin Walker, The Kavanaugh Court and the Schechter-to-Chevron Spectrum: How 
the New Supreme Court Will Make the Administrative State More Democratically Accountable, 95 IND.
L.J. 923 (2020); Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). For book treatment, see, for example, ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S
ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016), which distin-
guishes argument, urging the importance of a judicial check on the administrative state; and 
CARL HULSE, CONFIRMATION BIAS: INSIDE WASHINGTON’S WAR OVER THE SUPREME COURT,
FROM SCALIA’S DEATH TO JUSTICE KAVANAUGH (2019), which advocates the appointment of 
an activist federal judiciary that will “deconstruct” the administrative state and ease burden-
some regulation. See generally, e.g., Symposium, Thirty-Seventh Annual Federalist Society National 
Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2019).
290. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (pro-
posing that courts defer to the institutional competence of the administrative agencies).
291. See supra note 97 on Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541 (2012).
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the post-Warren Court political positioning of the Justices is revers-
ing, or at least shifting, in cases presenting the question of state re-
sponsibility. And this suggests that changes of heart are occurring 
on the rôle of courts in cases challenging official wrongdoing.
It will be interesting to see if regret for doctrines of deference 
comes to suggest a similar regret for our overwrought Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence. Why would today’s small-government 
conservatives want to remove government from judicial oversight? 
For that matter, why would today’s liberals want to avoid instantiat-
ing the Bill of Rights and justice in the individual case?292
That the Court’s conservative majority would imagine blanket 
state impunity to be a conservative position and should struggle to 
fit the position into our federalism and the Constitution is, in my 
view, incomprehensible. A rethinking of true conservative values in 
this context—instantiation of the rule of law, domestic peace, and 
protection against overweening or abusive governance—is long 
overdue.
It may seem fanciful to suggest that the newly potent conserva-
tive Court could turn the Court’s long hostility to federal common 
law actions toward reconsideration of federal common law defenses.
Yet the new conservative Court has an opportunity to become the 
Court of enforcement of the Constitution and laws. Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, the author of one of our proudest cases, Brown v. 
Board of Education,293 was a Republican, and the Warren Court over-
saw a new birth of freedom. The first Justice Harlan, who dissented 
so eloquently in Plessy v. Ferguson,294 was a conservative Southerner.
I would guess that our conservative Justices, some now in the 
prime of their lives, having been put to the task of writing uncon-
vincing opinions to justify decisions in cases like Hernandez v. Me-
sa295 and RJR-Nabisco v. European Community,296 are ready to oversee a 
more lawful nation—ready to enforce the Constitution and laws, 
and ready for actual textualism and zealous insistence on the rule 
of law.
Especially at this moment in history, a time of ignorant and divi-
sive attacks on our national traditions and ideals—on civil society 
itself—the Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Roberts, 
could come into its own as a saving custodian of our rights, our 
laws, our national ideals, and our domestic peace.
292. For example, see supra note 97 on Astrue.
293. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
294. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
295. 140 S.Ct. 735 (2020).
296. 136 S.Ct. 2090 (2016).
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CONCLUSION
State immunity has been building and expanding in the Su-
preme Court for more than a century. Yet it seems obvious that 
sovereign immunity defeats justice. As Justice Miller put it in 1882, 
in a famous opinion on federal297 sovereign immunity:
Looking at the question upon principle, . . . we think . . .
the defense [of sovereign immunity] cannot be main-
tained. It seems to be opposed to all the principles upon 
which the rights of the citizen, when brought in collision 
with the acts of the government, must be determined. In 
such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except in the 
protection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which have 
been invaded by the officers of the government, professing 
to act in its name. . . . No man in this country is so high that 
he is above the law.298
Civil society rests, for foundation, on the rule of law. And the 
rule of law rests, for foundation, on a judiciary sufficiently inde-
pendent to ride herd on government. A democracy is only as good 
as its judiciary is empowered to protect the rights of persons as 
against the majoritarian branches. As Chief Justice Marshall said in 
our greatest case,299 Marbury v. Madison, “The government of the 
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, 
and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appella-
tion, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested le-
gal right.”300
These legacies of rule of law and judicial independence are be-
queathed us in our founding Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and 
the Civil War Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly 
imposes upon the states the duty of enforcing the rights of individ-
uals. We rely on the courts to expound these legacies. “It is em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”301
297. The two bodies of jurisprudence on sovereign immunity, federal and state, are sub-
stantially congruent and cases are often cited interchangeably.
298. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218–21 (1882) (dealing with the Union’s appro-
priation of Arlington, the Lee family’s homestead, for alleged incorrect proffer of a tax 
due). After the Lee opinion was handed down, the United States settled with the Lee family 
for some $200,000. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (Marshall, 
C.J.).
299. See Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1412 (2003) (rebutting revi-
sionist attacks on Marbury and Chief Justice Marshall).
300. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch), at 163.
301. Id. at 177.
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Had the Court in Franchise III clearly stated that it was simply de-
ploying a party-of-record rule, shielding the states from being sued 
as named defendants, I would not have written this paper. But the 
Franchise III Court attempted to embed immunity so deeply in the 
Constitution that in an action against an injured party’s own state 
worker or agency, his own state courts would be helpless to furnish 
justice under his own state’s law.
In the fact situation in Nevada v. Hall—negligence by a state 
worker causing personal injuries in another state—the case filled a 
remedial gap, ensuring that in our federal interstate system the 
basic workings of sound tort law would be accessible when, had the 
defendant been a private party, the plaintiff would have been per-
mitted to proceed. The risk of personal injury or death at the 
hands of a state worker should not fall on the injured party simply
because of the mischance that the injuror was a government work-
er from another state.
On the broad issue of state sovereign immunity for deliberate in-
juries inflicted by government officials from another state, the Su-
preme Court in Franchise III was even more gravely mistaken. Fran-
chise I had filled an even more consequential remedial gap. The 
Franchise III Court should have paused to consider whether the 
requisites of a civil society and interstate peace outweigh the desire 
of government trial teams to win cases. We cannot license the 
states to intrude on each other’s territory to harass or attack each 
other’s residents. It should have been obvious to the whole Court, 
and to the states themselves, that the opportunity presented in 
Franchise III was to secure a needed state power of territorial gov-
ernance and to put that power at the option of every state.
The Supreme Court threw away these salutary options, giving 
the appearance of a willful exercise of a secured political power. 
This, in the dubious interest of creating a constitutional shield 
against remediation of government lawlessness. The Court’s major-
ity has entangled itself in its own rewriting of history and in an ob-
solescent (and irrelevant302) critique of judicial review that younger 
theorists are coming to regret.303
There are institutions without which our federalism, our Union, 
and our democracy cannot thrive. These surely include access to 
courts, judicial oversight of government, remedies for wrongs, and 
302. Judicial review of government tort is to be distinguished from judicial review of leg-
islation. This paper is not an argument for return of the Lochner era, during which the Su-
preme Court was striking down useful laws, federal and state, as violating the Constitution. I 
am grateful to my colleague Sanford Levinson for raising this possibility of a revival of Loch-
ner-style judicial review at my faculty colloquium of November 15, 2019.
303. For the changing positions, for example, of the Federalist Society, see supra note 
289 and works there cited.
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justice in the individual case. These must and will be restored to us 
in full. Only case law stands in the way, and cases can be overruled.
The long reign of “general common law” under Swift v. Tyson304
was undone by Erie v. Tompkins,305 and the long reign of racial seg-
regation under Plessy v. Ferguson306 was undone by Brown v. Board of 
Education.307 Let us be confident that, however long we may have to 
wait, in good time the long reign of Hans v. Louisiana308 will be un-
done in the same way, with the stroke of a pen. With Hans the ob-
solescent Eleventh Amendment itself will fall into deserved desue-
tude, together with its background “postulates.”309 The long reign 
of manifold missteps that have led us to blanket federal immunity 
for the misconduct of government personnel310 will be undone. 
Seminole Tribe311 will be undone, so that at long last the power of 
Congress to deal with state misgovernance will be revived and 
honored. Under this new dispensation, the Supreme Court’s long 
abnegation of its basic duty to enforce the Constitution in actions 
against federal officials312—that, too, will be undone.
Even if we must wait a hundred years, conservatives and liberals 
together can look forward to that better day. Together, sharing our 
“decent respect for the opinions of mankind,”313 we can succeed. 
Our shared national traditions can and will be restored to us, and 
civil governance under the rule of law314 will take on renewed vigor 
and meaning.
304. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal courts can find better rules of gen-
eral common law to govern state-law cases).
305. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that application of law unidentified to some sovereign 
is unconstitutional).
306. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that racial segregation is constitutional as long as the 
two races are treated equally, although separated).
307. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that in matters of race, separate can never be equal).
308. 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).
309. Monaco v Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
310. These events culminate in Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019), which ruled, in ex-
tended dictum, that a blanket federalized sovereign immunity of the states in all cases in all 
courts requires non-enforcement, absent state consent, of all law, federal and state, that 
would otherwise govern a state as defendant.
311. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (stripping Congress of all its 
Article I powers to impose liabilities upon the states).
312. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
313. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
314. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218–21 (1882); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 
163; Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 64, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (KB 1607).

